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Abstract
Title of the dissertation: ”A growing gap between the integrated systems on 
the bridge and the end users. An approach 
considering safety and risk management”.
Degree: MSC
The dissertation is a brief investigation into the aspects of technology design 
regarding the seafarer and how the training of the seafarer  on that  technology is 
considered and carried out. The area of study is the bridge of a vessel, the bridge 
team management and the technology applied on it, specially the current integrated 
systems.
Aspects of how technology and automation in particular have changed the 
role of the Officers Of the Watch (OOW) regarding the task they need to perform, 
have  been  approached.  Particular  attention  has  been  given  to  the  human 
characteristics when interacting with this type of technology.
Safety and risk have been superficially touched upon from a Human Factor 
and Human Error perspective. Both terms seem to be important actors as causes of 
incidents and accidents. However, they involve certain indetermination in what they 
are  or  what  they  signify,  which  can  serve  to  be  depositary  of  other  causes  of 
accidents which remain hidden.
Different techniques in how to manage human aspects when assessing the risk 
are  introduced.  Industries  with  longer  trajectories  in  this  regard  are  using  new 
techniques more concerned with the context on which the action is performed. Still, 
that is not the case in the maritime industry.
The regulatory framework in IMO, as well as in certain quality organisations, 
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regarding the incorporation of integrated systems on the bridge and how is the human 
aspect considered in the process has been gathered and analysed.
In the concluding chapter a set  of implications are provided regarding the 
findings to this investigation. Some recommendations are given to the need of a new 
conceptualization of Human Factor and Human Error, as well as more specification 
on the term “familiarization”.  It  is  also recommended to  make the model  course 
regarding operational use of IBS for Masters and OOW mandatory.
KEYWORDS: Human Machine Interface, Training, Human Factors, Human Error, 
IBS, Technology, Bridge Team Management.
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- Chapter 1 - Introduction
1.1.- Motivation
From the beginning of the studies in Maritime Education and Training (MET) 
specialization,  the  section  regarding  how  the  Officer  of  the  Watch  (OOW)  was 
trained to handle the specific equipment on the bridge seemed particularly confusing.
In  this  sense,  the  training  with  specific  technology  seems  always  to  be 
included  under  the  term  familiarization,  which  means  very  little  at  the  time  of 
regulating  and  establishing  training.  In  addition,  looking  at  the  lack  of 
standardization of bridges, it is really impressive how deck officers, moving from 
one bridge to another, are able to operate on the different bridges safely. 
Having little experience in the maritime industry, i.e. reduced to the studies at 
WMU, with a Navy background as a deck officer, the perception of the author about 
the required training before being able to operate on board a specific vessel  was 
strongly influenced by Navy practices. 
In addition to the basic knowledge that involves the operation of a vessel at 
sea,  the officer  has to know and be trained in  using the equipment  before being 
appointed for duty. This is the normal practice; however, besides this strict system, 
problems in this aspect still exist. 
Therefore, the main motivation at the beginning was to understand how the 
maritime industry deals with the training of the OOW on the specific technology and 
later how the seafarer is considered when the technology is incorporated.
1.2.- General Background
The 1980s was a time of big changes in the shipping industry structure. The 
world trade experienced important growth due to the globalization of the world, a 
growth that the maritime transportation had to follow. The vessels increased speed, 
capacity of transportation of cargo and efficiency for loading/offloading operations 
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reducing the time spent in ports. At the same time, the price of fuel reached levels 
that had never been seen before and became a considerable operational cost (Tarver 
& Pourzanjani, 2003).
In response, shipowners started to manage costs and different practices turned 
to be a commonality. One of the practices was the incorporation of technology which 
got  more  presence  on  board  vessels  changing  how  the  work  was  performed  by 
humans and also the way the vessels were manned (Rowley et al, 2006). 
At first,  when the electronic equipment stepped into the navigation, it was 
used as a backup. For example, OOWs continued to use astronomical calculations 
and  electronic  navigational  aids  were  used  as  a  secondary  mean.  Radar  was  an 
excellent tool for navigators, for which they had to learn the principles of operation, 
capabilities and limitations. However, it had to be combined and cross checked with 
visual bearing. The real advantage that the Radar gave to the OOWs was allowing 
them to proceed safer in conditions of restricted visibility. Despite all these electronic 
applications, the OOW remained to be directly in control of the vessel's evolution 
(Muirhead, 1999).
After the 1980s, technology came on board taking over tasks that the OOW 
had to do by himself,  changing a long tradition of navigation.  Bridges  today are 
provided with autopilot and Integrated Bridge System (IBS)/Integrated Navigation 
System (INS), which deliver a continuous amount of synthesized data from different 
sources regarding the situation of the vessel. The OOW has to interpret this data and 
act consequently through these complex systems again. These systems can take care 
of the navigation in automated mode, so the role of the OOW has changed from 
being the active actor on the navigation, to be a monitor of the automated system 
which controls the navigation (Lutzhoft, 2004).
Furthermore, electronic integrated systems are considered to be more accurate 
than ever before (Swift, 2004), more reliable than humans and capable of providing 
better  situational  awareness  to  the  OOW.  They  make  the  bridge  of  a  vessel 
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resembling the cockpit of an air plane (Rowley et al, 2006). However, they did not 
substitute the presence of the human on board, only changed his task and reduced the 
number of persons performing watch.
Together with the mentioned changes, came changes in the knowledge and 
training that the OOW needed.  All of a sudden, the knowledge and traditions of the 
art and science of navigation fell out of practice and navigators had to adapt to the 
new situation.
In sum, technology came on board the vessel due to economical reasons but 
later,  considering  technology  as  more  reliable  than  the  human  being,  the 
incorporation  of  technology  had  a  strong  component  of  safety  in  it.  Today, 
competitiveness  add  even  more  value  to  keep  high  the  rate  of  incorporating 
technology (National Research Council [NRC], 2004 as cited by Lutzhoft, 2004). 
1.3.- The objective
Technology is being seen as a guarantee to keep a high level of safety and its 
application  within  the  maritime  industry  allocates  a  good  image  of  the  industry. 
However, not always did this technology applied on vessels give the expected results 
(Lutzhoft, 2004).
To  justify  this  shortage  in  performance  of  the  technology,  the  immediate 
answer is found on the side of the users, who do not operate correctly the technology 
provided (Nautical Institute, 2007). Still, the technology provided on vessel bridges 
needs the presence of humans to perform as was designed, and normally it is the 
human who makes a wrong input,  wrongly acknowledges an alarm, misinterprets 
information, and so on. But, is this shortage of technology an exclusive problem of 
the user? 
The objective of this research is to answer the question whether there is a 
growing gap between IBS/INS and the Bridge Team Management (BTM), which is 
affecting the safety operation on the bridge. In the pursuance of this objective the 
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research aims also to:
 Investigate  in the Human Machine Interface (HMI) concept and how it  is 
applied in the maritime industry.
 Investigate  different  perspectives  of  Human  Factors  and  Human  Errors, 
trying to find out whether the problem of the gap between integrated system 
and user is included in those two concepts or is assumed independently by the 
maritime industry.
 Determine whether it is possible to identify clearly the lack of proper HMI 
design as cause of accident, or it is normally included under Human Error.
 Investigate  the current pertinent  regulation addressing the incorporation of 
technology on bridges.  Particularly,  technology design  and training of  the 
users.
 To show by examples how safety operation on the bridge is affected when 
there   is  not  a  proper  connection  between  the  Bridge  Team Management 
(BTM) and the IBS/INS.
1.4.- Methodology
The present research refers to a gap between the electronic integrated system 
on the bridge and the user. This gap is identified in what is called HMI, which is one 
of the main issues in this investigation, and the training of the users of technology.
To  answer  the  question,  this  research  has  addressed  how  is  and  was 
considered the user in the design of IBS/INS and under what regulatory framework 
this technology is incorporated on board. Also, how the industry prepares the user of 
an IBS/INS to operate it safely.
In order to identify whether or not the gap between IBS/INS technology  and 
the end users constitutes a safety problem, the concept of Human Error has been 
approached  together  with  the  Human  Factor  concept.  Not  only  how  these  two 
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concepts  are  taken  in  the  maritime  industry  were  studied,  but  also  how  other 
industries do in order to gain a broader picture. One of the aims of this approach is to 
investigate  if  is  possible  today to  clearly attribute  as cause of  accident  problems 
between the technology and humans beside the well known cause Human Error.
In  this  research,  issues  related  to  the  high  turn  around  of  crews  among 
different vessels have not been addressed directly. However, some mentions to these 
issues are made as a reality that interfere with proper training with the equipment 
installed on board.
The word  technology used  in  this  paper,  was  assumed mainly to  refer  to 
IBS/INS systems. The reason for this assumption is that the provision of integrated 
systems  is  a  current  trend  on  bridges,  towards  other  subsystems  are  connected. 
Particular reference will be done to automation.
 This research could not be provided with data that could have been used to 
clearly determine the percentage or proportion of participation of this gap between 
IBS/INS and  end  users  in  the  affection  to  safety.  On  the  other  hand,  important 
amount  of  the  sources  used,  sustain  the  need  of  implementing  further  measures 
regarding  the  link  between  the  technology and  users,  arguing  that  this  aspect  is 
affecting safety.
Starting with the analysis, Chapter Two is dedicated to the HMI concept and 
how it is considered in different industries. It will be shown that until the end of the 
1990s there was no specific requirement to relate the technology with the user. It was 
a more technology centred era. Also, it describes the participation of ergonomics in 
the design of technology and what the roles of the user are when interacting with 
technology.  At  the  end,  one  particular  approach  was  carried  out  regarding  the 
perception that users have whenever they have to interact with technology. 
Chapter Three is  intended to determine how the Human Factor concept is 
allocated when dealing with new technology in current days. Together with it,  it will 
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be mentioned the aspect  of  Human Error and what  are  the current  techniques  to 
analyse  this  aspect  when assessing the risk.  It  was  studied how the International 
Maritime Organisation (IMO) assesses human aspects, and what Human Reliability 
Analysis  (HRA) techniques are in use by IMO. Since these techniques are being 
succeeded  by  the  so-called  “HRA  second  generation  techniques”  (Fujita  & 
Hollnagel, 2004), brief approach to these will be done.
In Chapter Four a study of some relevant documentation was done regarding 
the  implementation  of  technology  on  the  bridge.  It  was  divided  between  the 
mandatory current regulations and non-binding documentation. The reason was to 
indicate how these two groups of documentation address the aspects of HMI and 
training with new technology.
In Chapter Five the BTM is addressed in two different perspectives. One is 
considering  the  technology  and  human  resources  together  and  the  other  is 
considering  only the human resources. The chapter also has two accidents in which 
the lack of an appropriate operation of the technology was present. It was attempted 
to analyse these two accident using the information provided in previous chapters 
regarding  the  HMI  and  training  aspects.  Some  aspects  of  what  happens  when 
technology deteriorates are included.
In  Chapter  6  the  conclusions  of  this  research  are  provided  and  some 
recommendations are given.
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- Chapter 2 - Interaction between OOW and 
Technology
These  days,  the  OOW has  to  operate  a  bridge  populated  with  electronic 
devices. These devices take a big proportion of the task that in other times pertained 
to the OOW. The OOW turned to be the person who supervise the electronic devices.
In this chapter different aspects that affect the relationship between user and 
technology will be dealt with.
2.1.- Definitions  of  HMI  and  integration  of  safety  in  its 
design
The first definition is from the International Engineering Consortium (IEC). 
They define  HMI as  the  area  “where  people  and technology meet.  This  people-
technology intercept can be as simple as the grip on a hand tool or as complex as the 
flight deck of a jumbo jet” (http://www.iec.org/online/tutorials/hmi/). It is added by 
IEC that HMI has as main purpose to make itself “self-evident”, and it must be what 
the user's expectations are regarding the execution of the task with that machine.
The second definition comes from the German delegation to the IMO/Sub 
Committee  on  Safety  of  Navigation  (NAV):  “the  part  of  a  system  an  operator 
interacts with. The interface is the aggregate of means by which the users interact 
with  a  machine,  device,  and  system  (the  system)”  (International  Maritime 
Organization [IMO], 2007a, p. 37). 
Both definitions agree that HMI is the point on which technology and human 
has to coincide in order to carry out the task. However, the German definition does 
not consider the user's expectations.
Other  agencies  have  identified  the  aspect  of  integrating  humans  with 
technology  calling  it  Human  Factor  Integration  (HFI).  In  this  context,  HFI  is 
perceived  as  the  taxonomic  use  of  applicable information  about  human 
14
characteristics as well as behaviour and causes of motivation to apply them in the 
design of systems. Regarding human characteristics, they involve the use of sciences 
as  Psychology,  Anatomy,  Ergonomics,  Biomedicine,  among others,   and combine 
them  with  those  aspect  of  engineering  and  design  of  technology  (Sea  Systems 
Group,2006). 
Another approach found of HMI is in the field of surgery. In this field HMI is 
perceived  as  a  science  that  permits  empathizing  humans  interacting  with  the 
environment,  considering  the  technology  they  need  to  operate  and  consequently 
designing this technology with the knowledge acquired from human behaviour and 
expectations (Savatava & Ellis, 1994). 
Again looking at IMO, the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) Circular 878: 
“The interim  guidelines for the application of Human Element Analysing Process 
(HEAP) to the IMO rule-making process”(IMO, 1998c, p. 1), has another definition 
of HMI. They define HMI as the area of study where the design of equipment is 
analysed  with  the  human   characteristics  when  using  such  equipment,  with  the 
purpose of achieving high level of efficiency in the task. The document adds that 
“the aim (of HMI) is to achieve uniform design and layout”(IMO, 1998c, Annex p. 7) 
using ergonomics and education and training. 
Furthermore,  the  MSC  Circular  878  includes  a  list  of  five  areas  when 
considering  the  Human  Element1:  Technical,  Management,  Manning,  Work 
Environment/conditions and Training. Specifically,  the HMI is included under the 
Work environment/conditions referred as Man Machine Interface (MMI). It is further 
clarified  that  MMI  is  a  "technical  issue  that  has  implications  on  the  work 
environment"(IMO, 1998c, Annex p. 5). However it is not included in the Technical 
area2.
Among the definitions  cited above,  only those from IMO do not consider 
1 In Section 3.1 is described what is referred by IMO as Human Element.
2 See Appendix B
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user's expectations. On the contrary, the others definitions cited have considered that 
the  HMI  is  the  link  between  users  and  technology,  which  has  to  be  designed 
considering user's characteristics and expectations. 
Incidentally, the main reason to consider the user when designing the HMI is 
to diminish to the minimum possible the probability of error by the user, which is a 
safety issue. In this regard, it was found that developers and producers of technology 
do not integrate the safety concept until the last part of the design. Actually, the issue 
of safety is addressed at the last  stages of the product'  design,  consequently very 
difficult of doing it properly (Bernard & Hassan, 2002). 
Normally, the inclusion of safety is done mainly having in mind the rules and 
regulations. Furthermore, since there is not a standardized criteria in how to integrate 
safety  in  the  design  stages  and  that  normally  is  considered  a  hindrance  for  the 
designer, this aspect is frequently addressed in informal ways (Bernard & Hassan, 
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Figure 1: Integration of working situation in  
design (Bernard & Hassan, 2002, p. 2)
2002).
Bernard & Hassan (2002) made this discovery using an offset printing line as 
a  case  study.  They developed a  model,  shown in  Figure  1,  where  safety can  be 
integrated at early stages of the design. By using this model, the designers have to 
imagine  the  instances  of  human intervention and undesirable  events  and develop 
solutions. The solutions have to be weighed by the operators regarding whether the 
solutions  change  any  ergonomics  aspect,  or  reduce  visibility.  This  model  is 
applicable for any other field of technology production (Bernard & Hassan, 2002). 
2.2.- Ergonomics and HMI
It has been seen in the definitions of HMI the need for designing it under 
Ergonomic principles. In this section it will be mentioned what Ergonomics is, how it 
is regarded today in the maritime industry, and the advantages of using ergonomics 
not  only  in  the  design  of  new  bridges,  but  also  in  the  normal  life  of  working 
situations.
Wilson  (2000)  says  that  ergonomics  is  the  “theoretical  and  fundamental 
understanding of human behaviour and performance in purposeful interacting socio-
technical systems, and the application of that understanding to design of interactions 
in the context of real settings” (Wilson, 2000, p.557). 
Adapting this definition to the bridge of a vessel, ergonomics would mean the 
corresponding  understanding  of  the  standard  characteristics  of  the  OOW  when 
operating the electronic systems on the bridge, considering the devices of the system 
that  interacts  with  the  user,  e.g.  displays,  arrangements  and  disposition  of  the 
devices, shapes and types of controls and alert devices.
Nevertheless, the determination of the standard characteristics of an OOW 
represents a real problem in the shipping industry; vessels can be manned by officers 
from all over the world, involving different cultures, values and language (Squire, 
2005). 
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Moreover, bridges are not always designed from scratch as in the case of new 
buildings; updating the bridges with new technology is a normal practice in shipping. 
Different  brands  of  equipment  are  interacting  with  the  user,  and  the  user  has  to 
accommodate himself to the different interfaces (Rowley et al, 2006). Therefore, the 
intervention  of  Ergonomics  not  only  in  design  of  the  technology  but  whenever 
changes take place  on board would be the best.
At first, the motivation for introducing technology was mainly due to saving 
costs  and  technology  producers  were  more  interested  in  satisfying  ship  owners' 
expectations. In this regard the technology for the vessel was more designed having 
in mind what the technology should perform to satisfy the needs of the customer. In 
other words, the design of that technology was more technology-centred. (Rowley et 
al, 2006)
Consequently, the application of Ergonomics in the maritime industry was not 
from the beginning. At first,  these principles were perceived by the industry in a 
negative way, as affecting the normal traditions and customs. While in the late 1990s 
there was no strict regulations regarding the design of bridges, nowadays principles 
of design using Ergonomics are more common. (Helm, 2008). 
As  a  result,  the  maritime  industry  today  has  a  public  concern  about 
ergonomics  design  on  vessels.  Major  stakeholders  and  international  law  making 
bodies are using this aspect in the design of the bridge of the vessels with a relevance 
that was not common 15 years ago3. 
In  essence,  the  role  of  Ergonomics  is  two  fold:  to  understand  purposeful 
interactions  between  people  and  artefacts;  and  to  design  interacting  systems, 
maximising  the  capabilities,  minimising  the  limitations,  and  satisfying  the 
expectations of the users.  Therefore,  Ergonomics can provide important feedback 
after having provided the vessel with new technology, which would lead to further 
improve future systems.(Wilson, 2000)
3 Chapter 4 includes some of these documents.
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Therefore,  the  potentiality  of  Ergonomics  to  understand  purposeful 
interactions could lead to a better understanding of the wrong actions committed by 
the user of technology and to  switch from technology centred-design to user-centred 
design (Wilson, 2000).
In addition, Ergonomics provides designers with the information about what 
are the best ways by which the users will perform better with  technology (Wilson, 
2000).  Ideally,  those  ergonomic  scientists  should  need  to  work  closely  to  the 
designers and users, providing intermediation between the needs of the users and the 
limitations of the designers. Normally, designers and users think in a different way 
about technology (Lutzhoft, 2004; Kristiansen, 2005; Reason, 1990). 
Designers use a causal model based on what is the reaction of the system after 
applying certain variable or input. Users, on the other hand, use the perspective of 
how a certain variable can be applied to the system in order to achieve the desired 
result (Lutzhoft, 2004). The users are more interested on the intended result from 
using technology; designers pursue a permanent search to further improve the design 
of technology.
Furthermore, designers and developers of technology tend not to consider the 
user in early stages of design. For example, in order to apply the safety regulations, 
designers put some barriers that could reduce the visibility or the accessibility to the 
system by the users. Then, when the system is in normal operation, the users can find 
the system's safety-barriers to be not understandable, and consequently eliminating 
or disabling them, or even they can start performing procedures which are away from 
those procedures designed by the designers (Bernard & Hassan, 2002). 
In this  regard,  Lutzhoft  (2004) and Rowley (2006) say that there is  proof 
showing what designers and developers put on the display devices, for example, not 
necessarily what the mariners want to see.
In addition, many system designers perceive operators (users) of the system 
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as unreliable and inefficient, and then they intend and foster the substitution of the 
user by incorporating automated devices in the task to make it safer (Reason, 1990). 
However, the outcome of this technology incorporation does not result always in the 
desired level of safety, particularly when technology is designed and incorporated 
without  considering  the  user  and  without  giving  him  or  her  the  corresponding 
training (Lutzhoft, 2004; Rowley, 2006; Dekker, 2006).
As an illustration, there is a case where a company decided to incorporate an 
Electronic Chart System after one of its ship grounded. Soon after, the company had 
another ship grounding with heavy damage on the hull where the Electronic Chart 
System was installed but not used as it should be. The report of this accident did not 
include as direct cause of the accident the lack of proper use of the Electronic Chart 
System. However, the report specifically mentions that the Master was not using it 
and he had never received training on its operation (Marine Accident Investigation 
Branch[MAIB], 2007). 
Another important advantage of using Ergonomics as often is possible, is that 
it has a consequence in the way the organisational culture perceives Human Error. 
Wilson  (2000)  states  that  the  blame  culture  is  against  a  sound  application  of 
ergonomics. The reasoning behind it is that blaming the humans without asking why 
he or she made this error, there will be no progress. Only by eliminating the blew 
fuse, the situation that led to the error, will be brought back (Wilson, 2000). 
One example is  the  oil  spill  incident  from the Tanker  Vessel  Randgrid  in 
2000. The Randgrid was unloading crude oil at Tetney terminal monobuoy, in the 
United Kingdom (UK). It  was moored as usual by the bow. A hawser was fixed 
through a chafing chain stuck by the chain stopper. During the night there was an 
unintentional  operation of the chain stopper  from the bridge which provoked the 
loosing of the mooring manoeuvre and consequent disconnection of the hoses. The 
outcome of the incident was an oil spill of 12 tonnes of crude oil (MAIB, 2002).
The  aperture  of  the  chain  stopper  was  controlled  from a  multifunctional 
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console on the bridge by pressing the F9 button. Presumably, with the chain stopper 
control  displayed,  someone  tried  to  shut  down  the  hydraulic  pumps  for  which, 
coincidently, F9 had to be pressed. The Company conducted an investigation and 
found that the cause was Human Error. The error was that someone pushed a button 
on a keyboard selecting the wrong display (MAIB, 2002).
 Had the company introduced the application of Ergonomics, possibly in the 
first place the chain stopper and hydraulic pumps would not be operated from the 
same console. Also, the cause of the accident could have been completely different, 
which probably aimed to improve the design of the HMI in this case. 
2.3.- The OOW perception of technology
It  has  already mentioned,  the  importance  of  the  user's  characteristics  and 
expectations for the HMI. The expectations that  users have about technology are 
influenced by the way they perceive it (Rowley et al, 2006). This section describes 
how the user's perception of technology was 25 years ago and how it is today.
When the trend of introducing technology increased notoriously in the 1980s 
there  were  many  uncertainties  which  raised  even  more  questions  and  many 
researches tried to forecast what would happen. The problem of having only one man 
performing watch on the bridge or the existence of dual purpose officers, put serious 
challenges for Education and Training and for regulatory framework. At that time, 
the  opinion  of  seafarers  about  technology  was  “Too  many  but  not  needed;  Not 
reliable  enough;  Poor  operational  manual;  Configuration  of  the  bridge  not 
comprehensive enough (Muirhead, 1992, p. 7). 
Again, in the research of Lutzhoft (2004), her findings showed that seafarers, 
not totally refusing, are not very keen in using the technology and they are least keen 
when they are under pressure. According to her findings, seafarers prefer to keep the 
method they know already4 (Lutzhoft, 2004). 
4 One example of this is given in Section 5.2. Particularly the reaction of the Second Officer when 
he did not understand the evolution of his vessel.
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In  2007,  in  an  article  that  appeared  in  Alert,  one  master  wrote  about 
automation  and  Standard  of  Training,  Certification  and  Watch  keeping  1978 
Convention as amended in  1995 (STCW),  and linked the both with the need for 
having an electronic officer in the Safe Manning Certificate. He said that one of the 
goals of automation is to reduce costs and he identified that one of the main problems 
with automation is that it  becomes unreliable when a failure or unexpected result 
arises.  This  failure  causes  the  crew to  become  overloaded  because  they  have  to 
switch the system to manual and wait for shore personnel to fix it. At the end, he 
added that, if no solution is found to this problem, "automation just for the sake of 
saving costs is an accident waiting to happen..."(Jiménez, p. 3, 2007).
The  perception  narrated  above  about  automation  is  clear.  “Automation  is 
great when it works”, according to Lutzhoft (2004, p. 1). Users of technology tend to 
lose  trust on technology when failures appear (Bainbridge, 1983), and consequently 
tend to by pass the technology introducing themselves in the task.
In addition, there are findings of scary perceptions of the integrated systems 
by seafarers. This perception leads the users not to use efficiently the tool that they 
are supposed to operate. This behaviour is even more dangerous than taking the way 
of using the equipment with the possibility of making a mistake (Rowley et al, 2006). 
Furthermore, bridges designed to be operated with an automated system are 
not so handy to be operated manually. Particular skills and dedicated personnel are 
required,  who  are  no  more  available  as  they  used  to  be.  Training  the  users  in 
equipment functionalities, limitations and capabilities is the only way for seafarers to 
become familiar with and attain the necessary trust in the equipment (Rowley et al, 
2006).
Nevertheless,  there  are  samples  where  seafarers  are  appointed  on-board 
without knowing how to operate the equipment (IMO, 2003b).
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2.4.- Role of the OOW when interacting with technology
This section will show how the interaction users and technology takes place 
from the side of the users and what the factors are that contribute to the HMI. Users 
who  interact  with  technology,  generally  play  three  roles:  monitor,  collector  of 
information and actuator (Lutzhoft, 2004). 
Starting  with  the  monitoring  role,  the  OOW  has  to  monitor  that  the 
technology is  performing  according  to  his  intentions,  e.g.  following  the  planned 
route, adjusting speed to arrive on the expected time, and so on. The OOW is not 
directly involved in the navigation any more. When something goes wrong the OOW 
will take notice after the system indicates it; therefore, the OOW all of a sudden will 
have to adjust himself or herself from normal operations to abnormal operations and 
try to manage the situation. 
Unfortunately, studies have shown that humans beings are poor monitors of 
the automated systems. Humans tend to rely more on the warnings and emergency 
alerts  than  on  their  own  checking  processes  putting  much  trust  on  the  systems. 
Lutzhoft  &  Dekker  (2002)  made  these  assertions  studying  the  outcome  of  the 
accident of the Passenger Vessel Royal Majesty, in June 1995. 
Very briefly, none member of the BTM realized that the Global Positioning 
System (GPS)  receiver  had changed to  Dead Reckoning Mode.  This  device  was 
providing position to the INS which was in automation mode, and did not recognize 
any hazard in the change of mode of the GPS. The vessel went off track 17 miles and 
grounded. Nobody was alerted of what was happening until too late, nothing could 
stop the grounding (National Transportation Safety Board [NTSB], 1997).
Also, users tend to consider a system that has been working without failure, 
to be less prone to fail. When nothing wrong is happening, the task of monitoring the 
system is almost meaningless, which makes the monitor not to be very attentive to it 
(Lutzhoft & Dekker, 2002). 
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On the contrary, when something wrong occurs unexpectedly, a high level of 
attention is needed to understand what is happening, acknowledge the malfunction 
and  react  accordingly.  This  drawback  in  the  monitoring  role  of  the  user  was 
acknowledged recently by IMO by the following statement where it is analysed the 
use of HRA in the Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) and is specifically pointed out 
that technology can create “long periods of low workload when a high degree of 
automation is used. This in turn can lead to an inability to respond correctly when 
required“ (IMO, 2007c, p. 26).5
Other industries can allocate the task of only monitoring, indicating that if 
something goes wrong, another person more qualified has to be called for to take 
care  of  the  malfunction  (Bainbridge,  1983);  unfortunately,  this  possibility  is  not 
available  on  a  ship.  The  OOW can  call  the  Master  when  the  former  does  not 
understand the situation; however, nothing assures that the Master could have more 
skills than the OOW to manage a failure in technology.
Another aspect to consider in the monitoring role is the fact that technology 
today does not show the user what is happening inside it. This reduces the  user's 
comprehension of its role as monitor of the system and raises uncertainty of what to 
monitor. Technology has put at least two layers among the intended result and the 
user. Starting from the user, the first layer is the HMI and the second layer is the 
“Task Interactive System”6 (TIS) (Reason, 1990, p. 174). The latter is the part of the 
system at the lowest level which directly controls the execution of the task (Reason, 
1990). 
For example, the OOW has to control the course of a vessel. At present, the 
vessel  will  have  an  autopilot  system  which  will  receive  the  intended  heading 
information from the OOW as an input. The input is done through the HMI. The 
autopilot will send the signal to the so called TIS, which at the end will control the 
rudder position in order to put the heading of the vessel on the ordered course. After 
5 Further reference to the Human Reliability Analysis is made in Section 3.3
6 Section 4.2, ISO 17894 refers to the Task Interactive System as Equipment Under Control.
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the TIS has performed the task, it will send a signal back to the HMI which will 
present it in a display, informing the user that the order is being executed. In the 
meantime, the user has no idea how the rudder is controlled. 
Another contribution to the problem of monitoring technology by OOW is 
given by Barnett (2007). He confirmed the weak monitor capacity of the seafarer and 
highlighted  the  occurrence  of  inadvertent  erroneous  actions  that  can  cause  an 
accident delayed in time. These actions are called latent errors and bring about new 
sources of accidents (Barnett, 2007).
The second role is acting as a collector of information. Lutzhoft & Dekker 
(2002) have determined that when collecting information, the user has to integrate 
the information given by the system with the normal practice, rules and regulations 
to give it sense in order to accomplish the task. 
This role is affected by the fact that the information is coming from different 
types of equipment made by different manufacturers, which signifies different HMI 
designs.  Special  care  in  this  role  regards  the   mode  awareness.  This  mode  will 
determine which information will be displayed. Unfortunately, studies have shown 
that users tend to assume that the information given by the system is accurate without 
any kind of  verification,  which at  the end lead to  bias  the  decision of  the users 
(Lutzhoft & Dekker, 2002).
The third role mentioned is the actuator, on which the user having monitored 
the  system,  collected and integrated the information provided,  is  able  to  make a 
decision and take the necessary action. Normally, this action is performed using the 
same system, which will be updated with the outcome of the new action and will be 
displaying feedback information (Lutzhoft, 2004).
The  three  roles  described  above  are  performed  permanently  and  without 
specific order. The user is a monitor and also a collector of information, or could be 
introducing  an  action  while  monitoring  the  system,  and  so  on.  The  level  of 
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performance  of  the  user  in  whatever  role  will  be  strongly  influenced  by  the 
knowledge they have about the equipment (Dekker, 2006). 
In this regard, studies found that users often have some buggy knowledge of 
the equipment (Dekker, 2006). They know how to operate it but they do not know its 
limitations and capabilities. In the case of seafarer, it was found that they are not 
familiar  with the emergency procedures after a failure on the equipment. According 
to  an  United  States  NTSB'  study  cited  by  Rowley  et  al  (2006),  in  which  100 
accidents were analysed, 35% of the casualties were found with a contributory cause 
the “inadequate knowledge about the equipment”(p. 19).
Coupled with the necessary knowledge about the equipment, Dekker (2006) 
established that that knowledge should be organized in the user's mind and the user 
should be able to call for it according to the context of the situation. Otherwise, the 
user could have acquired the knowledge but not be able to use it. Therefore, Dekker 
(2006) claims that it is requisite that the users learn about the equipment and practice 
with it in order to internalise the knowledge.
However,  with  some  automated  systems  the  aspect  of  organizing  and 
internalising the knowledge is difficult, because automation had reduced the chances 
for seafarers to have hands-on experience (NRC, 1994). “Computers can increase 
system  reliability  to  a  point  where  mechanical  failures  are  rare”(Decker,  2006, 
p.151), leaving not many opportunities to the users to keep the skills high to manage 
system malfunctions.
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- Chapter 3 - The Human Factor
“People remain a basic component with all their strengths and weaknesses which can both cause a 
disaster or prevent it” (O¨Neil, 2001a, p. 1)
The term  the Human Factor is used with different meanings and this Chapter 
will  mention  different  definitions  of  the  Human  Factor.  Special  mention  will  be 
placed to the aspect of Human Error.
3.1.- Conceptualization of the Human Factor
 There  is  an  indication  that  80% of  accidents  have  Human  Factor  in  its 
causality chain (Hetherington et al,  2006). According to the literature reviewed, it 
was found that the term Human Factor is being used to refer either to the people 
inside the organisation or the factors that influence behaviour or to a field of study. 
Starting with the Human Factor as people inside the organisation, Mr William 
O´Neil (2001) declared that the seafarer is the “the human factor that operates at the 
cutting edge of the sea transportation”(p.1). He refers to it as the core of the industry, 
who has the final control and the responsibility of the safe and efficient waterborne 
transportation.
The German delegation to the IMO/NAV subcommittee, submitted recently a 
document with the following definition of the Human Factor: “workload, capabilities 
and limits of a user trained according to the regulations of the organisation7”(IMO, 
2007a, p. 37). Moreover, IMO has another term when addressing the people in the 
organisation, and that term is the Human Element. Human Element is defined as a 
“complex, multidimensional issue that affect maritime safety”(IMO, 2003c, p. 3) and 
needs particular attention in order to understand it. 
7 In the cited document, the term Organisation is referring to the IMO.
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In 2005, the United States delegation to the MEPC submitted a document 
acknowledging that  the concept of the Human Element  has to follow the current 
situation of "technology, safety culture and vessel operations"(IMO, 2005b, p. 1) and 
a  systematic approach was needed. A check list  to organize the work on Human 
Element  aspects  is  provided,  which  was  adopted  from  check  list  that  the 
petrochemical  industry uses to manage changes  of any aspect  in its  organisation8 
(IMO, 2005b).
Nevertheless,  Graveson (2005) indicates that both terms, Human Factor and 
Human Element, are used in shipping indistinctly to refer to seafarers matters, but 
often these terms are not “properly addressed”(p. 1).
Following, referring to Human Factor as the factors that influence behaviour, 
the European Commission (2001) in a research and development study, highlighted 
that in any means of transport the presence of human beings and their relation with 
the machine is essential. For that, they consider all aspects of the Human Factor that 
have  an  outcome  on  the  behaviour  of  individuals,  which  consequently  have  an 
impact on the safety and efficiency of transportation.
Thomson  (2008),  points  out  that  there  is  no  standard  criteria  in  what  is 
included inside the Human Factor that affect human behaviour. He sustains that it is 
common to confuse in the causes of an accident the Human Factor with a “symptom 
or  outcome”(p.  2)  of  a  certain  Human Factor.  He considers  that,  so  far,  there  is 
agreement in the following human factors:
 fatigue;
 alcohol and drugs;
 crew qualifications and training;
 workplace;
 sensory overload;
8 See Appendix A
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 fitness including mental factors;
 crew communication difficulties;
 law  of  conservation  of  energy  including  procedures  and  operating 
manuals; and
 deliberate or wilful behaviour.
Thomson (2008) specifically excludes from Human Factor the situational awareness, 
which he says is an outcome or symptom.
In third place,  assuming Human Factor  as a  field  of  study,  Squire  (2005) 
defines Human Factor as the “body of scientific knowledge relating about people and 
how they interact with their environment, especially when working” (Squire, 2005, p. 
5).  Sea Systems (2006) add more participation of the so called soft sciences in the 
concept of Human Factor: “an engineering discipline that applies theory, methods 
and research findings from Ergonomics, Psychology, Physiology, Anatomy and other 
disciplines to the design of manned systems” (Sea Systems, 2006, p. 1-12). 
Similar to the previous definition, Earthy and Sherwood (2007) identified that 
the Human Factor pertains to the human science and is affected by three aspects:
 Human engineering - looking forward for the optimization of the human and 
machine performance; 
 Safety – identifying and assessing hazards to health in the operation of the 
ship; and
 Health and Safety – identifying the risk when the ship is working in normal 
or abnormal situations.
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3.2.- Human error  and Technology
Normally  a  wrong  operation  of  technology on  the  bridge  is  attributed  to 
Human Error.  This usually leads  to the incorporation of further technology,  even 
more complex (Lutzhoft, 2004). 
At  first,  Kristiansen  (2005)  citing  statistics,  places  that  participation  of 
Human Error in accidents is between 75% to 90% (p. 314) of the cases, which is 
similar to the information from Hetherington et al (2006) referring to the Human 
Factor. He found, that  the term Human Error is not a straightforward concept, so he 
questions the accuracy of the statistics.
Furthermore, Kristiansen (2005) says that the term Human Error involves a 
generalization where many things can fit in to it, which could be leaving no side to 
determine other potential reasons for the wrong action committed. He characterizes 
Human Error as a vague concept and the perception of it is highly influenced by the 
background of those investigators appointed to analyse the Human Error. Also,  he 
argues that  this generalization of the Human Error as a term on which failures can be 
justified, it  is also used by the designers of technology as a way to “get clear of 
responsibility for problems not considered as technical”(p. 42).
In  addition,  Fujita  & Hollnagel  (2004)  shares  with  Kristiansen (2005)  the 
opinion that Human Error is not a clear concept. They back the idea that when an 
accident occurs, it is because there are surrounding error-prone situations or activities 
which lead to the particular error of a person or group of persons. Furthermore, they 
consider that attributing everything to Human Error is “fundamentally a social and 
psychological process and not an objective, technical one”(Woods et al, 1994 as cited 
by Fujita & Hollnagel, 2004).
Moreover,  the  United  States  Nuclear  Regulatory  Commission  Office  of 
Nuclear  Regulatory  Research-NUREG-  (2007)  has  launched  recently  the  User's 
Guide of its HRA technique9. In this publication there is no definition or  assumption 
9 It refers to the HRA technique ATHEANA which is briefly described in Section 3.4
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of the term Human Error. It is only stated that the “term Human Error is only used in 
a very general way, with the terms human failure event and unsafe action being used 
to describe more specific aspects of human errors”(United States Nuclear Regulatory 
Commision Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research [NUREG], 2007, p. xvi).
Regarding how the background of Human Error investigators influence the 
result  of  the  investigation,  Dekker  (2006)  cited  a  research  with  the  purpose  of 
identifying errors in a normal watch of a traffic control tower. The researchers used 
two groups of investigators to spend time observing normal watches of an air traffic 
control tower. One group was composed of traffic controllers and the second group 
was composed of  experts  on psychology and psychiatry.  Both of  them identified 
Human Errors in the performance, but the errors identified were dissimilar between 
both groups (Dekker, 2006). 
Incidentally,  there  is  the  common  assumption  that  whenever  a  failure 
happens, Human Error should be involved. Dekker (2006) and Reason (1999) sustain 
that there is not such easy determination. The system when it is working it needs the 
interaction with the human, who is  connecting the technology outcomes with the 
environment. The assumption mentioned is backed with another assumption that the 
electronic  systems  are  more  accurate  than  humans,  that  they are  “safe  and well-
functioning systems”(Dekker, 2006, p. 76). 
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Conversely, the problem with the two previous assumptions is that systems 
are designed to be operated by humans, at least in the case of the shipping industry so 
far. Therefore, it is the combination user and technology that creates a further system 
in which both limit or enhance each other's performance. In this reasoning, how the 
HMI is designed plays a particular and important role.
Further, Rasmussen (1982) cited by Reason (1990), provided a classification 
on  the  types  of  errors.  This  classification  of  errors  is  called  the  Generic  Error 
Modelling System (GEMS), and is based on categorization of three  different human 
performance levels:
1. Skill based. In this category slips and lapses of the skill based performance 
are  located.  The  error  normally is  originated  by a  departure  from a  well-
established routine (Reason, 1990). Performance in this level is the result of 
“highly  trained  tasks”  (Kristiansen,  2005,  p.  395)  that  are  carried  out 
unconsciously by the user.
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Figure 2: Human performance levels (Kristiansen, 2005)
2. Rule based. This category is related to the procedures to follow, facing certain 
situations. The user needs to be trained in this procedures.
3. Knowledge based. This category is when the user has to solve an unexpected 
problem. The user has to integrate his or her system's knowledge, consider 
the  context  and  solve  the  problem.  In  this  category,  the  users  have  good 
experience using the technology, however, they can behave as novices when 
facing a new situation (Reason, 1990).
(Kristiansen, 2005)
Also, Kristiansen (2005) related this three performance levels with the size of 
damage and frequency of occurrence. This is shown in Figure 2. It can be appreciated 
that  the  skill  based  errors  are  the  most  frequent  but  purport  less  damage  when 
comparing them with errors committed in the other two types. 
The Figure 2 is useful to see that knowledge of procedures and principles of 
technology can be crucial for problem-solving, because they are the foundations on 
which the user will base the decision process.
Regarding  the  most  common  errors  that  a  user  commit  in  his  or  her 
interaction with technology, Dekker (2006) identified those contained in Table 1.
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Table 1: Roles of the user of technology and common 
errors (adapted from Dekker, 2006)
Roles Errors related
Monitor Lack of mode awareness
Overload of / get lost in  information
Actuator Not coordination off computing entries
Lack of awareness of any changes in the 
system
Collector of in-
formation
Increase workload processing informa-
tion
In addition, there are some particularities that technology has brought with, 
which in a certain level foster the occurrence of the mentioned errors: 
1. Technology can make things invisible, or not appreciable by human beings. 
The presentation or interfaces can be fashionable but they can hide a lot 
complexity  of  information.  The  user  can  be  aware  of  the  status  of  the 
system, but not about the behaviour inside.10
2. The  operators  may  switch  to  manage  the  computer  interface  instead  of 
managing the situation. This is the same that Lutzhoft (2004) warned about 
when the tool becomes an end in itself, therefore it becomes inefficient.
3. The possible change of mode without alerting the operator.
4. Computers are not aware of the surrounding situation. The integrated system 
will perform the task according to the input parameters. However, if  any 
changes occur in the environment, the integrated will not notice them by 
itself;  the  integrated  system  will  need  to  be  updated  with  the  new 
parameters, otherwise they will not react accordingly to the new situation.
(Dekker, 2006).
3.3.- Management of Human Error in Shipping – FSA+HRA
Contrary to  what  was  mentioned in  Section  3.2,  IMO has  a  definition  of 
Human Error and accordingly has a procedure to assess the impact of Human Error 
in  the  industry.  IMO  defines  Human  Error  as  “a  departure  from  acceptable  or 
desirable practice on the part an individual or a group of individuals that can result in 
unacceptable or undesirable results”(IMO, 2007c, p. 21). 
The definition does not show any consideration of context or situation; it was 
included here not only to show the difference of criteria that IMO has with other 
practitioners of Human Error studies, but also, to point out that this perception of 
10 An example of this particularity was given in Section 2.4 p. 19
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Human Error could be against the need to go into the HMI concept in depth. 
The  definition  locates  the  individual  at  the  centre  of  the  potential 
unacceptable or undesirable practice and does not considers the possibility of having 
a  technology centred  designed,  with  which humans could not  operate  safely and 
efficiently.
 IMO has included the analysis of Human Error in its methodology of risk 
assessment, called FSA and has been in used in IMO since 1997; recently, it was 
updated and condensed in one document (IMO, 2007c). Its purpose is to be used as 
the basic methodology when incorporating or updating regulations; currently, it  is 
perceived as the normal methodology at the time of analysing different risk scenarios 
needed to be dealt with regulations.(Kristiansen, 2005).
The FSA involves 5 steps in a close-loop which are shown in Figure 3. The 
principle is that once the regulation has been created, its outcome needs to be verified 
taking the methodology again to Step 1. The five steps are:
1.- Hazard Identification (HAZID).
2.- Risk Analysis.
3.- Risk Control Options (RCOs).
4.- Cost Benefit Assessment (CBA).
5.- Recommendations for decision-making.”
(IMO, 2007c, p. 5)
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In  this  respect,  hazardous  industries  have  recognised  that  to  improve  the 
accuracy in any risk assessment, it is necessary to approach the human participation 
to failures. Therefore, a methodology originated in the nuclear industry is utilized 
and is identified under the name HRA (Kristiansen, 2005). 
This  HRA methodology had to  be adapted to  the  reality of  the  particular 
industry. For example, de nuclear industry does not incorporate human participation 
at early stages of the risk assessment due to its high level of automation where the 
participation of the human being is almost null (IMO, 2007c).
On  the  contrary,  the  maritime  industry  and  the  vessels  in  particular,  the 
intervention of the Human Element in the system is more frequent and immediate. It 
can be appreciated in Figure 3 that the HRA plays a role on three of the five  steps of 
the IMO FSA. This is due to the recognised “high-level task analysis” (IMO, 2007c, 
p. 20) needed in this particular industry.
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Figure 3: FSA Flow chart with indication of HRA steps (adapted from Kristiansen,  
2005, p. 284)
FSA steps that 
contains HRA 
steps
Generally speaking the HRA is divided in five steps as follows:
1. Identification of key tasks.
2. Task analysis of key tasks.
3. Human error identification.
4. Human error analysis.
5. Human reliability quantification.
(IMO, 2007c, p. 20)
IMO states clearly that the HRA should not be overstressed and always has to 
be done in the same level of soundness as the corresponding FSA. Due to the limited 
data on the maritime field regarding Human Error, its determination depends much 
on expert opinions, however to carry on quantitative analysis HRA techniques  are 
also considered.
Incidentally, there is a variety of techniques that can be applied to the HRA 
whose use will depend upon the availability of data, results expected, deepness of the 
analysis, and so on.(IMO, 2007c)
 IMO normally uses two techniques: 
 Technique of Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP);
 Human Error Assessment Reduction Technique (HEART). 
(Kristiansen, 2005)
Both techniques are characterized by using a series of predetermined factors 
that contain quantified aspects affecting user's performance. THERP call its factors 
Performance Shaping Factors  (PSF) and HEART call  its  factors  Error  Producing 
Conditions (EPC). They differ from each other, but the principle is the same: the 
consideration of predetermined factors that independently affects the performance of 
the user.
IMO considers  THERP as the “best known and most”(Kristiansen, 2005, p. 
332; IMO, 2007c, p. 34) used technique in analysing and quantifying Human Error 
probabilities.  At  the  same  time,  it  is  recognised  that  is  highly  dependant  on  its 
Human Errors database, which is from the Nuclear industry. However, THERP can 
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result in a high effort of analysis which can be more intensive than the effort required 
for the corresponding FSA. Nevertheless, its use is highly recommended due to be 
considered a good technique to  analyse the RCOs and to evaluate systematically the 
role of Human Error.(IMO, 2007c)
For the case of HEART, IMO considers it simpler than THERP and with less 
necessity of having pre-saved data regarding Human Error. Also, IMO underlines the 
fact that HEART takes into consideration aspects of environment surrounding the 
tasks and Ergonomics (IMO, 2007c).
Kirwan (1997) has found that HEART does not perform well when assessing 
certain  types  of  errors,  such  as  undesired  actions,  simple  slips,  tasks  needing 
decomposition and interdependent tasks. In addition, he identified that a certain level 
of inconsistency is  allocated in  how the General  Error Probability is  determined, 
which is a value allocated by the assessor to determine the probability of occurrence 
of certain error. Regarding the selection of EPCs, he also found certain inconsistency 
in this technique, mainly because the selection of EPC was related to the background 
or experience of the assessor. 
HEART provides a fixed list of five contributions to reduce error when the 
FSA is in the stage of providing measures to minimize the identified risk,:
1. “Impaired system knowledge.
2. Response time shortage.
3. Poor or ambiguous system feedback
4. Significant judgement required of operator.
5. Level of alertness resulting from duties, ill health or the environment."
 (IMO, 2007c, p. 25)
Regarding  the  Human Machine  Interface,  three  of  the  contributions  listed 
above are closely related to it,  namely numbers 1, 3 and 4. The difficulty is how 
these five contributions are implemented after being accepted. For instance, are they 
applied on the seafarer improving his or her training and education to fight against 
the impaired system knowledge? Or, are they applied on designing a new system or 
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improving the current one?
Kristiansen  (2005)  citing  information  from  the  IMO  website,  said  that 
according  to  IMO,  the  maritime  community  is  spending  “80%  of  the  available 
resources” (p. 295) to technical aspects, dedicating the “20%” (p. 295) rest to the 
Human Element. This distribution is not logical when looking at the data pointing 
out that 80% of the accidents are due to Human Error.
Regarding these two techniques which are considered to pertain to the first 
generation of HRA techniques, Kristiansen (2005) has indicated that there have been 
criticized  by those who sustain  the  difficulty of  determining  Human Error  based 
mainly  in  predetermined  factors.  Those  criticisms  comes  particularly  from 
ergonomics practitioners which perceive the impossibility of determine Human Error 
without a thorough consideration of context and situation (Kirwan, 1996).
Kristiansen  (2005)  provides  a  list  of  shortcomings  found  in  this  first 
generation techniques which is shown below:
● Questionable data used by these techniques to reflect  real  situations when 
assessing or predicting error probabilities.
● Lack of consistency regarding errors of commission.
● Inexistent proofs of accuracy of these techniques regarding their predictions.
● Arguable assumptions about human behaviour.
● Not enough treatment  of PSF, particularly how this factors affect behaviour 
and performance.
● Static consideration of the situations.
● Mechanical decomposition of human actions.
● Uncertainty of the quantitative results.
● Not good to explain the cause of Human Errors.
● Lack of systematic task analysis.
● Lack of strategies to reduction of errors.
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3.4.- Human error from other perspectives – CREAM & 
ATHEANA
Two  other  approaches  to  assess  Human  Error  will  be  mentioned  in  this 
section  that  purport  different  foundations  from  THERP and  HEART.  They  are 
identified as part of the second generation of HRA techniques and are the result from 
lessons learned from the formers techniques (Kristiansen, 2005).
To begin, Fujita & Hollnagel (2004) sustain that the use of PSF or EPC to 
establish the performance of the human being is not appropriate. On the contrary, 
they consider that it is necessary on every occasion to analyse the context which is 
what will be predominant to determine the Human Error.11 
In this  sense, Fujita & Hollnagel (2004) support this so called the second 
generation of HRA techniques, specially:
 Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM).
 A  Technique for Human Element Analysis (ATHEANA)
Starting with CREAM, this  methodology introduces  what  is  called the 10 
Common Performance Conditions (CPCs) which determine the context. The CPCs 
has to be considered interdependent and can increase or reduce the probability of 
error. They have to be applied regarding the level of control that the user has over the 
situation. Both, CPCs first and levels of controls later, will be listed below. The CPCs 
are:
1. adequacy of organisation,
2. working conditions,
3. adequacy of MMI and operational support,
4. availability of procedures/plans,
11 Section 4.2 regarding ISO 17894 shows that the same principle is sustained by ISO. ISO calls 
context as “context of use” and establishes what aspects of this context of use should be 
considered.
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5. number of simultaneous goals,
6. available time,
7. time of day (circadian rhythm),
8. adequacy of training and experience,
9. crew collaboration quality,
10. communication efficiency”.
(Fujita & Hollnagel, 2004, p. 146).
CREAM considers that in any situation, four could be the level of control, or 
modes, that the user can have over the situation, and these modes can perfectly fit in 
any analysis of accident situation, for example, in the maritime industry:
1. SCRAMBLED. In this mode the user has no possible control, no planning or 
preparation.  Decision  are  totally  by  chance  and  actions  normally  are  not 
related to the situation.
2. OPPORTUNISTIC. In this mode decisions are not sufficient. Success is not 
totally  achieved.  It  happens  when  lack  of  competence  or  external  factors 
among others, limit the possibility of a thorough planning process.
3. TACTIC. In this mode, actions respond to current situations. Planning has 
been done, however not completed. No foreseen situations are considered.
4. STRATEGIC.  Thorough  analysis  and  planning.  Actions  concurrent  with 
planning and situations.
(Fujita & Hollnagel, 2004)
Following  with  ATHEANA,  which  is  a  technique  applied  on  the  nuclear 
industry  and  has  as  basic  premise  that  it  is  necessary  to  contextualize  potential 
situations in order to predict failures. It sustains that the PSFs in combination with 
the plant conditions (nuclear plant conditions) can lead to an error forcing situation, 
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where the user can not review a miss diagnosis even when receiving contradictory 
information. (Powers, 1999)
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- Chapter 4 - Regulatory status of the HMI regarding 
technology on the bridge
Safety Of Life At Sea 74 Convention  and STCW 78 Convention amended in 
1995, are the two IMO Conventions which deal with the incorporation of technology 
and training on the bridge. Currently, ISO has implemented mandatory standards to 
regulate the incorporation of technology on the bridge and its design.
Furthermore,  there  is  a  pile  of  IMO non-mandatory documents  which  are 
intended to be recommendations and guidelines in the aspect of dealing with new 
technology.  Often,  they  are  the  predecessor  of  future  mandatory regulations  and 
indicate how the maritime community attention is shifting towards the issues.
4.1.- IMO Mandatory Regulations
First,  the  SOLAS  1974  Convention  deals  with  bridge  design  and 
incorporation of technology in Chapter V. According to its Regulation 15, all  the 
concerning matters relating to the incorporation of technology on the bridge should 
be oriented under the following fundamentals principles:
1. to ease the task;
2. to improve bridge resource management;
3. to ease the access to the necessary information;
4. “to indicate the operational status of automated components” (IMO, 2004a, p. 
366);
5. to permit an efficient decision making process by the bridge team;
6. to facilitate the work on the bridge, preventing fatigue or interference with the 
task;
7. “to  minimize  and  detect  human  error  on  the  bridge”.  (IMO,  2004a,  p. 
366-367).
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Above all, the principles indicate that technology should help the task of the 
OOW. However, there is no consideration to the HMI in this incorporation. All the 
principles are centred in what the technology should be capable of performing.
In addition, SOLAS 74 Convention contains in its Chapter 9 the Management 
for  Safe  Operations  of  the  ships,  which  introduces  the  International  Safety 
Management (ISM) Code  to improve the Management of Safety at sea. ISM Code 
expresses in “broad terms” (IMO, 2002, p.5) procedures to enhance safety which are 
particularly allocated on the Company. 
The  Company has  to  set  measures  versus  known  risks  and  to  develop  a 
program to improve the skills of the personnel relating to safety operation. It also has 
to establish procedures for emergency preparedness, for training of new comers and 
maintenance of equipment to avoid “hazardous situations”(IMO, 2002, p. 11). There 
is no detail regarding consideration of HMI.
Second,  the  STCW 78  Convention  as  amended  deals  with  the  aspect  of 
training certification and watch keeping of seafarer. It specifically remarks that the 
provisions are to be applied only to the training requirements described in the STCW 
78 Convention as amended, consequently  all other types of training are not bound by 
this Convention (IMO, 2001).
Moreover, as well as in the ISM Code, the STCW 78 Convention as amended 
dedicates  particular  attention  to  the  training  of  new  comers  allocating  this 
responsibility on the company.  One particular requirement is to assure that seafarers 
are familiarized with “all ship arrangements, installations, equipment, procedures and 
ship characteristics that  are  relevant  to  their  routine or  emergency duties” (IMO, 
2001, p. 33 Convention). 
Likewise, regarding the general requirements to perform watch, the STCW 
Convention  as  amended  requires  “the  familiarity  of  (the)  officer  with  the  ship's 
equipment, procedures and manoeuvring capability” (IMO, 2001, p. 152 Code) and 
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the  “operational  status  of  bridge  instrumentation  and  controls,  including  alarm 
systems” (IMO, 2001, p. 153 Code).
In addition,  Section A-I/14 of the Code provides that   the Company shall 
ensure by means of written procedures that fresh personnel has the chance to have a 
“reasonable opportunity to become familiar” (IMO, 2001, p. 24 STCW Code) with 
the equipment they are required to operate.  However,  there is no specification to 
what  is  the  level  of  familiarization  expected  in  the  Convention  to  consider  it 
satisfactory .
Finally, the STCW 78 as amended, addresses the minimum requirements that 
the deck personnel should comply with, which are further detailed in the Code to this 
Convention. Above all, there is no requirement regarding the knowledge about the 
specific  equipment  installed  on board  the  specific  vessel  where  the  seafarer  will 
operate, but familiarization.
4.2.- ISO 17894 – “Ships and marine technology — 
Computer applications — General principles for the 
development and use of programmable electronic systems in 
marine applications”
This document set down mandatory standards principles for marine electronic 
systems.  It  is  a  binding  regulation  that  applies  particularly  to  the  producers  of 
technology. This document refers to the marine electronic system as Programmable 
Electronic  Systems  (PES):  “any shipboard  system based  on  one or  more  sets  of 
Programmable Electronic (PE) devices that are connected to input devices and output 
devices for the purposes of implementing control, safety or monitoring”(International 
Standard Organisation [ISO], 2005, p. 13). 
The PES always has to interact in three levels; the first is with the user, the 
second is  with  the  Equipment  Under  Control  (EUC) and the  third  is  with  those 
external  devices  not  belonging  to  the  PES,  but  in  a  way  provide  or  receive 
information to/from it (ISO, 2005).
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The document mentions that any PES should follow the system engineering 
philosophy, by which the requirements of the system are collected from the users and 
other  related  operators  with  the  goal  of  providing  “operational  capability”  (ISO, 
2005, p. 17), having in mind the complete life cycle of the PES. It is recognised that 
there will always be trade-off to manage between “competing factors of performance, 
risk and cost” (ISO, 2005, p. 17).
Furthermore, it addresses the fact that PES effectiveness will depend upon a 
thorough analysis of the “context of use” (ISO, 2005, p.2). Important aspects of the 
context  of  use  are  the  user'  characteristics,  tasks  expected  to  be  performed,  the 
software  and  hardware  of  the  PES,  the  systems  that  interact  with  the  PES,  the 
environment on which the PES is expected to perform.
However, the consideration of the context of use turns out to be particularly 
difficult when acquiring Commercial-Off-the-Shelf (COTS) equipment. In this latter 
case, it is recommended to conduct a generic mode approach (ISO, 2005).
The context of use is required to be considered whenever a risk assessment on 
the incorporation of PES is carried out. In addition to the context of use, the impact 
on safety and performance of the ship that the PES will have has to be considered. 
The  context  of  use  and the  impact  on safety will  be  the  two elements  that  will 
determine the soundness of the risk assessment (ISO, 2005).
This  document  provides  a  set  of  20  principles  under  which  any PES for 
marine purposes has to be designed and operated. Below are quoted seven of those 
principles that were identified as having close relation with the aspect of interface 
between the human beings and machines:
1. "The PES shall provide functions which meet user's needs" (p.7).
2. "Functions shall be appropriately allocated between users and PES" (p.7).
3. "The PES shall be tolerant of faults and input errors" (p. 23).
4. “The PES shall be acceptable to the user and support effective and efficient 
operation under specified conditions" (p. 26).
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5. "The operation of the PES shall be consistent and shall correspond to user 
expectations of the underlying process" (p. 27).
6. "The interaction between the PES and the user shall be controllable by the 
user" (p. 28).
7. "Human-centred activities shall be employed throughout the life cycle" (p. 
32).
Finally, this document stresses the use of the context of use as a basis in the 
design  and  development  of  PES.  This  context  of  use  will  be  used  with  the 
characteristics  of  the  future  user  and  considering  the  task  to  be  performed.  This 
approach is more in line with what the second generation of HRA analysis techniques 
is saying, than with the THERP and HEART techniques.
4.3.- IMO non-mandatory regulations
The documents chosen here have as main subject INS and IBS. The purpose 
of checking this documentation is to see chronologically how the perception of the 
HMI interface has evolved since 1996 to 2007. 
 1996.- Resolution MSC.64(67) “Recommendations on performance standards 
for IBS”. This Resolution define IBS as: “a combination of systems which are 
interconnected in order to allow centralized access to sensor information or 
command/control  from workstations,  with  the  aim of  increasing  safe  and 
efficient ship’s management by suitably qualified personnel“ (IMO, 1996, p. 
3).  The  definition  purport  an  implicit  knowledge  of  the  system  by  the 
personnel,  and  an  improvement  of  safety.  However,  this  improvement  of 
safety will depend upon the proficiency of the operator interacting  with the 
system.
The document contains one reference to the HMI under the name of 
MMI, claiming that the MMI should be “easily understood and in a consistent 
style”(IMO, 1996, p. 5), there were no more explanation or detail. Also, it is 
mentioned  that  the  IBS  should  be  operable  by  a  seafarer  with  the 
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corresponding  certifications.  Going  further,  the  Resolution  details  what 
should be the technical capabilities of the system, and little reference is made 
to the ergonomics and HMI.
 1998.-  Resolution  MSC.86(70)  “Annex  3  - Recommendations  on 
performance  standards  for  INS.  This  Resolution  defines  INS  as:  “a 
combination of systems that are interconnected to increase safe and efficient 
navigation by suitably qualified personnel” (IMO, 1998a, p. 9).
Standards, functionalities and limitations of the system are described 
and  there  is  space  for  ergonomics  considerations.  As  specific  guidance 
regarding the HMI, it says “integrated display and control functions should 
adopt a consistent HMI philosophy and implementation”(IMO, 1998a, p. 12), 
not giving any explanation about the mentioned philosophy.
The Resolution does not consider the training that the users have to 
have to operate efficiently this equipment and to be prepared for failures. 
 1998  cont.-  MSC  Circ.  891  –  “Guidelines  for  the  on-board  use  and 
application of computers”. These guidelines define Integrated System as: “A 
combination of Computer-Based Systems (CBS) which are interconnected in 
order  to  allow  centralised  access  to  sensor  information  and/or 
command/control” (IMO, 1998b, p. 2).
In addition, it is specified that a CBS should be capable of performing 
the needed automated processes, accept the user input and give the pertinent 
information to the user. Furthermore, it is explicitly mentioned that a CBS 
should  be feasible  of  being  operated  “without  previous  knowledge by the 
user“(IMO, 1998b, p. 5). 
Contrary  to  the  two  first  Resolutions  shown  in  this  section,  these 
guidelines dedicate special attention to the user interface where it is stated 
that they have to follow ergonomic criteria and be user-friendly. As a sample 
of  that  is  the  need  for  specific  documentation  in  the  form of  operational 
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guides that should be provided to the users. 
Regarding the training, it is said that it has to be made looking forward 
to qualify personnel in the operation and maintenance of the “equipment in 
normal, abnormal and emergency situations” (IMO, 1998b, p. 9). However, it 
is  contradictory that  the  CBS should  be  capable  of  being  used by a  user 
without previous knowledge,  and later  the document states that  training is 
needed (IMO, 1998b).
 2000.-  MSC/Circ.  982  “Guidelines  for  ergonomic  design  of  bridges 
equipment and layout”(IMO, 2000, p. 1). Its purpose was to provide support 
in  the  design  of  new  bridges  giving  ergonomic  requirements,  and  to  be 
considered for further revision of Chapter V of SOLAS 74 Convention (IMO, 
2000, p. 3).
This circular basically deals with the layout of the bridge as well as 
distribution of the equipment. In a minor scale it approaches aspects of HMI 
as  the  display  of  information,  the  management  of  alarms,  the  controls 
operation  and  the   mode  awareness.  It  constitutes  actually  a  reference 
document by further IMO documents in respect of ergonomics on the bridge 
and better utilization of bridge equipment by the users. 
One of the major points recommended to stress on is the consistency 
in  procedures,  displays,  actions  required  by the  operators,  accessibility  to 
controls.  It  is  underlined  that  the  system  should  provide  unambiguous 
information. 
Also,  using a  coding  that  should  be understandable for  the  user  is 
considered.  For  that,  the  Guidelines  call  for  the  use  of  “familiar 
wording”(IMO,  2000,  p.  23).  The  nature  of  shipping  makes  this 
familiarization  hard,  for  saying  the  least,  keeping  in  mind  the  variety  of 
different cultures and nationalities that can operate on the bridge during the 
bridge lifetime (Squire, 2005).
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Above all, the circular identifies seven workstations and each of them 
involves the corresponding functions and tasks. Those functions are:
− Workstation for navigating and manoeuvring.
− Workstation for monitoring.
− Workstation for manual steering, also called Helmsman's workstation.
− Workstation for docking on the wings.
− Workstation for planning and documentation.
− Workstation for safety.
− Workstation for communication.
(IMO, 2000, p. 3)
 2003.- MSC/Circular1061 – “Guidance for the operational use of IBS”. These 
guidelines give a definition of mode awareness,  situational  awareness and 
failure  analysis,  in  relation  with  the  operation  of  the  Integrated  Bridge 
System.  The  document  incorporates  the  need  of  adding  a  section  on  the 
Vessel  Operating  Manual  specifically  dedicated  for  IBS.  This  section  is 
supposed to have summarized information of check lists and procedures to be 
carried out when alarms are triggered, among other types of information. 
Three  different  types  of  procedures  are  superficially  described, 
identified as normal, abnormal and emergency procedures, which the seafarer 
has to be familiar with. Also, it is recommended the  special care that has to 
be borne in mind when incorporating new technology. Regarding the training 
for  those  operators,  the  guidelines  put  on  the  Company's  shoulders  the 
responsibility  of  settling  the  knowledge  and  skill  based  training  (IMO, 
2003a).
 2003 cont. -  MSC Circ. 1091 – “Issues to be considered when introducing 
new  technology  on  board  ships”.  The  document,  underlining  that  the 
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introduction  rate  of  computer  assisted  systems  had  been  in  an  increasing 
trend, identified the need to address aspects of interrelation among users and 
technology.  Among  those  aspects,  the  document  highlights  the  need  for 
designing  computer  assisted  systems  using  a  user  centred  philosophy, 
identifying the new training needs and adapting them to the education of the 
users.
Also, it recognizes the diversification of the technology applied on the 
bridges, which complicates more the situation at the time of identifying the 
training  needs.  Furthermore,  the  document  underlines  that  training  on 
technology is "not always achievable or possible" (IMO, 2003b, Annex p. 1). 
The author considers this statement particularly important because here IMO 
is  saying  that  there  are  cases  where  seafarers  are  not  familiar  with  the 
equipment they have to operate. There is nothing new in it, apart from the 
official  recognition,  which  is  later  in  the  document  reinforced  with  the 
characterization of the danger to safety that it signifies.
The  Document  claims  for  standardization  at  least  for  those  most 
common operations; however, there is no mention to how IMO recommends 
to achieve this standardization.
Regarding training of users with technology, the document states that 
when dealing with bridges that are been refurbished, or bridges from new 
built ships, the crew normally is provided with a good level of familiarization 
with the equipment. Later on, that crew has to pass-on the information to the 
relieves in a non formalized process called "cascade training"(IMO, 2003b, 
Annex p. 2). 
The document acknowledges that young generations of seafarers tend 
to  be more  keen and better  than older  generations  in  the use Information 
Technology  (IT).  However,  the  document  underlines  that  this  young 
generation tend to over rely on the systems.
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 Furthermore, the document uses the same terminology as Lutzhoft 
and Dekker  (2000)  giving the same perception about  how automation has 
impacted the industry creating new paths of error and not eliminating tasks, 
but changing them. 
Moreover, the document coincides with Bainbridge (1983) about the 
human limited capacity in  monitoring automation systems,  a  problem that 
gets a more serious character when the automation system has been working 
without failures and is already installed when the users takes over.
Finally,  the  document  shows  as  a  fact  that  what  technology  has 
provided is an increase in information, which needs to be managed by the 
same user, and that clog of information constitutes a serious hazard.
 2004.- MSC 78/11/3 -  “Safety of Navigation. Bridge design, equipment and 
arrangements.  Submitted  by  International  Association  of  Classification 
Societies  (IACS)”.  The  document  provides  what  IACS  call  Unified 
Interpretation (UI) of SOLAS 74 Convention Chapter V, and the “Standards 
for Bridge Design, Equipment Arrangement and Procedures (BDEAP)"(IMO, 
2004b, Annex p. 8). The purpose of the BDEAP is to facilitate the safety 
operation on the bridge and to be used as a "check list" when designing or 
modernizing bridges.
Specially, the document adds four more additional bridge functions to 
those mentioned in MSC/Circular 982: “extended communication functions, 
monitoring and control of ballasting and cargo operations,  monitoring and 
control  of  machinery,  monitoring  and  control  of  domestic  systems”(IMO, 
2004b, Annex p. 11); however, this document consider that the functions can 
be grouped in a way to reducing the workstations needed, which is not the 
same found in the MSC/Circular 982.
Furthermore, the document provides a list of standard equipment, but 
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it states clearly that it  is "regarded as the responsibility of the owners and 
users  that  procedures,  knowledge and training of the bridge personnel  are 
related to the individual ship's bridge system”(IMO, 2004b, Annex p.  15). 
Going further, it states that the mentioned procedures should be specified in 
the Company and Ship Manual and in the ISM procedures as well.
Regarding  the  principles  of  design  of  navigational  systems,  it  is 
specifically  stated  that  they  have  to  follow  the  ergonomic  and  human- 
machine  interface criteria.
Finally,  it  was  established  that  the  requirements  in  the  document 
contained are thought to be mandatory for IACS when acting as Recognized 
Organisation on behalf of the Flag State according to ISM Code.
 2004 cont.-  IMO Subcommittee on Standards of Training and Watch keeping 
(STW)  36/3/1  “  Validation  of  model  training  courses.  Model  Course- 
Operational use of IBS” . The aim of the course is to “provide(s)  generic 
training in the use of IBS and INS”(IMO, 2005a, p. 8) to Masters and OOWs 
for vessels equipped with IBS or INS. The course has declared 7 objectives, 
among them is the understanding of HMI by the user when interacting with 
IBS. This course proposal suffered amendments (IMO, 2005a). However, the 
core of the course was not changed and is listed since 2006 in the Model 
Courses available (IMO, 2006). 
The  document  starts  acknowledging  that  the  operation  of  an  IBS 
“requires a level of knowledge beyond the normally given”(IMO, 2004c, p. 4) 
to an OOW. Moreover, the lack of standardization in this kind of equipment is 
specifically recognized and a set of recommendations are given to producers 
of this technology and to the shipping companies. These recommendations 
regards carefully the documentation that has to be given to the users by the 
manufacturers to ease the familiarization stage.
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Giving particular attention to the lack of standardization, for the very 
first time in IMO Model Courses (IMO, 2004c), this course incorporates the 
need to familiarize the user with the particular equipment to be operated, after 
receiving this Model Course.  This requirement intends to follow the spirit of 
the Section 6 of ISM Code (IMO, 2004c).
The  course  covers  particularities  such  as  types  of  IBS/INS, 
definitions, changes in the subsystems associated with IBS/INS, principles of 
using IBS/INS, mode awareness, failure analysis, and so on. It is scheduled to 
be delivered in 40 hours.
The inconvenience of this model course is the stress put on the use of 
Full  Mission  Simulator,  an  asset  which  is  not  available  in  all  MET 
Institutions; therefore, making it difficult to be applicable throughout different 
Flag  States.  Almost  half  of  the  course  is  expected  to  be  delivered  using 
simulators. 
 2007.- NAV 53 / Inf. 4 – “Revision of performance standards for INS and IBS 
–  Report  of  the  correspondence  group  for  INS  and  IBS  -  submitted  by 
Germany”. The document underlines the need to assume INS as “one system” 
towards which other subsystems interact with. It gives reasons justifying the 
use of INS on board, as follows:
1. INS supports safety of navigation by evaluating and combining data 
from several sources, consequently producing information.
2.  INS provides mode and situation awareness;
3. "INS aims to be demonstrably suitable for the user and the given task 
in a particular context of use". 
4. “The  INS  aims  to  ensure  that,  by  taking  human  factors12 into 
12 Attention should be given to how this document define Human Factor. The definition was quoted 
in Section 3.1.
54
consideration; the workload is kept within the capacity of the operator 
in  order  to  enhance  safe  and  expeditious  navigation  and  to 
complement  the  mariner's  capabilities,  while  at  the  same  time  to 
compensate for their limitations. “
(IMO, 2007a, Annex 1, p. 1)
The justifications chosen are closely related to the HMI. For example 
Number  1  speaks  about  the  quality  of  the  INS  of  evaluating  inputs  and 
combining them. Still it is not clear how INS can be able to do this without 
the participation of the user, who is at the end the one who makes the correct 
evaluation. Automated systems are abstracted from the environment and need 
the participation of  the  human to  realize  a  close-loop evaluation with the 
input  data  and  the  desired  outcome  (Bainbridge,  1983;  Reason,  1990; 
Lutzhoft, 2004).
Number  2,  claims  that  INS improves  situational  awareness.  In  this 
regards, some accidents exist proving that due to over reliance on automation 
systems, the users tend to loose capability of situational awareness (Rowley et 
al, 2006). 
Numbers  3  and 4 describe the  importance  of  considering the  user; 
however, other researches have  shown that so far the design of these systems 
have been more technology centred (Rowley et al, 2006).
Furthermore, the document highlights the need for using principles of 
HMI in the overall design of the system. It is stressed that the design should 
be facilitating its  understanding and operation by the user,  underlining the 
control of erroneous inputs and assuring the quick and accurate interpretation 
of the system information output by the user.
Also,  it  gives  special  attention  to  the  system documentation.  This 
includes   manuals  containing  description  of  function  and  failures, 
presentation of data, structure of redundancy, integrity monitoring, adjustment 
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of  parameters  and  installation  with  interconnection  and  power  supply 
arrangements (IMO, 2007a, Annex 1, p.33). 
In addition, the document specifies that a familiarization course for 
the specific INS installed on board has to be given to new operators. This 
provision  is  said  to  be  under  the  spirit  of  the  ISM  Code.  However,  this 
familiarization  course  is  required  to  be  as  short  as  possible,  stressing  the 
practical side. Adding that for a qualified user, 30 minutes should be enough 
to consider him or her familiar with the system.
56
- Chapter 5 - Bridge Team Management and Human 
Machine Interface
 The technology applied on the bridge has to be used by the OOW acting with 
his or her team. The BTM becomes an important concept to define. Cases are found 
where the BTM are seriously affected by a lack of comprehension of the technology.
5.1.- Bridge Team Management
The efficiency of the watch on the bridge will depend upon the quality of the 
personnel and the technology applied on it (Swift,2004). Besides, the personnel has 
to know how to use the technology efficiently and safely.  BTM is the term most 
commonly used to identify the operational performance of  personnel and technology 
on the bridge. 
IACS has provided, for the new revision of standards for IBS/INS, one long 
definition  of  BTM13 from which  some  words  have  been  highlighted  to  ease  the 
understanding.  The  key elements  of  the  IACS definition  are  manning the  bridge 
according  to  the  particular  situation,  the  equipment  fitted  on  the  bridge  and  the 
familiarization of the crew members with such equipment. It is mentioned that those 
seafarers should be properly trained. 
Consequently, the BTM for IACS is the crew trained and familiarized with 
the equipment and the equipment itself.  In addition, the members of BTM  has to 
know how to react in case of failure of such equipment (Swift, 2004).
Incidentally, another concept of BTM is related more exclusively to human 
13“Safeguarding  that  the  composition of  the  bridge  team is  continuously  appropriate in 
relation to operational  conditions  by manning dedicated  workstations outfitted,  arranged 
and  located  for  performance of  specific  functions  and  effective  and  safe  bridge team 
operations by  properly  trained  and  fit  individuals;  familiar  with instruments  and 
equipment to be used and with their individual  duties and responsibility as member of the 
current bridge team and with the function(s) to be performed at the individual workstations of 
the bridge team” (IMO, 2007b, p.8).
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resources: “BTM refers to the management of the human resources (HR) available to 
the navigator -helmsman, lookout, engine room watch, etc.- and how to ensure that 
all members contribute to the goal of a safe and efficient voyage”(Bowditch, 2002, p. 
364)
It does not mention a word about the equipment used by the OOW. Bowditch 
(2002), gives an even higher priority to the OOW on the bridge, considering that 
whatever technology fitted on the bridge, he or she has to be capable of using the 
technology effectively and safely.
Moreover, three aspects are recognised as having strong participation when it 
is  tried  to  improve  the  human  performance,  and  these  are:  “professional 
development, organisational structure and technology”(NRC, 1994, p.  6). 
 Professional  development  is  regarded  as  education  and  training  of  the 
seafarer, where also the training is included on his or her task and the related 
equipment. 
 organisational structure is considered to be hierarchical distribution,  as the 
distribution of responsibilities, functions and tasks on the bridge as well.
 Technology is regarded as the equipment the users have to operate on the 
execution  of  the task.  It  involves  aspects  of  design of  the  equipment  and 
aspects of interaction with the user. 
(NRC, 1994)
These three aspects have to be used in conjunction and updated with each 
other. For example, while state-of-the-art technology can provides modern means to 
carry out the task on the bridge, it  will not be able to do so without the specific 
training  in  relation  to  its  operation  by  those  operators.  Also,  since  technology 
changes the execution of the task, the structure of the team organisation has to be 
reviewed (NRC, 1994).
Following,  there  are  two  accident  where  a  problem of  knowledge  of  the 
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technology by the BTM were verified. These two examples occurred two years ago; 
fortunately,  the  outcomes  of  both  accidents  did  not  involve  any  loss  of  life  or 
pollution; however, they constitute an indication of one very serious hazard.
5.2.- Heeling Accident on M/V Crown Princess (18 July 2006)
The Crown Princess is a passenger vessel of 
113,561 gt, with 19 decks, 289 metres in length and 
48.5  metres  wide.  It  was  finished  in  March  and 
christened in June  2006. The Accident Report does 
not  give  exact  information  of  the  date  of  being 
appointed for duty. The accident occurred in July of 
the same year which means that the crew had not 
more than 4 months operating on board this vessel 
(NTSB, 2008).
The  vessel  was  considered  to  be 
appropriately manned and the crew well rested. The 
Crown Princess had just left Port Canaveral in Florida, United States, with 3,285 
passengers  and 1,260 crew members,  for  its  next  destination,  New York.  On the 
bridge remained the Captain, Staff Captain, Second Officer, two Fourth Officers and 
two helmsmen. The Crown Princess was equipped with a NACOS 65-5 automated 
INS, which was considered the latest version made by Sam Electronics at the time it 
was installed aboard (NTSB, 2008). 
Under the Captain's orders, the vessel was proceeding in automated control at 
20 knots with the speed control passed to the engine room. The Captain realised that 
the  vessel  started  to  perform an undemanded  turning  to  port.  Consequently and 
agreeing with the advice of the Staff Captain, the Captain ordered to increase the 
Rudder Limit14 from 5 degrees to 10 degrees intending to control this turning to port.
14 The Rudder Limit is a parameter that can be selected by the OOW which limit the maximum angle 
of the Rudder to both sides
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Figure 4: Crown Princess
(NTSB, 2008).
Without solving the problem, the Captain and Staff Captain left the bridge, 
handing over the conn to the Second Officer. The Second Officer was reported on 
duty on board the Crown Princess on July 2006. He spent 5 days familiarizing with 
the ship and then started to perform duties as OOW. Having taking over the conn, he 
realized that the vessel kept the tendency of turning to port. Then, he tried to correct 
this  trend  switching  from automated  control  to  manual  control  and  steering   the 
wheel by himself (NTSB, 2008). 
Unfortunately, the Second Officer not receiving the feedback he expected in 
the time he expected, he moved the wheel many times to both sides in maximum 
angles. The vessel was proceeding at 20 knots. A heeling to starboard increased up to 
24 degrees. This unexpected heeling angle caught crew and passengers unprepared 
and as a final result almost 300 people were injured, from which 14 were considered 
as serious injuries (United States' Code of Federal Regulations as cited by NTSB, 
2008). The relief Captain was the first to arrive to the bridge and ordered to reduce 
speed, which almost immediately solved the heeling angle and the vessel became 
upright again. (NTSB, 2008)
5.2.1.- HMI aspects
1. TRAINING. The Second Officer' previous vessel was the Diamond Princess 
which was equipped with a NACOS INS system, similar to that of the Crown 
Princess. He had been on board the Diamond Princess for almost three weeks. 
(NTSB, 2008)
According  to  Lutzhoft  and  Dekker  (2002)  users  are  provided  with 
mental  models  at  the  time  of  interacting  with  technology.  Those  mental 
models are moulded by “expectations and knowledge, training and education, 
and actual experience of using (the) system”(Lutzhoft & Dekker, 2002, p. 88) 
on different real occasions. 
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The Second Officer declared in the accident investigation that he was 
not familiar with the use of the NACOS INS 65-5 in automated control mode 
because  the  former  vessel  was  used  in  Alaskan waters  where,  due  to  icy 
waters, the normal practice was to sail under manual control (NTSB,2008). 
Furthermore, he had had a three days course in NACOS in 2004. He 
was considered to have had all the requirements satisfied at the time of taking 
over the conn. 
2. FAMILIARIZATION.  It  cannot  be  said  that  the  Second  Officer  was 
unfamiliar  with  the  NACOS  INS;  however,  this  familiarization  was  not 
enough to help him in managing the situation. His 5 days of familiarization 
with the vessel were registered, which can be considered to be in agreement 
with the STCW and the ISM Code.
3. CONTROL OF THE SITUATION. Errors are originated from the fact that 
the user of the technology or machinery, having faced a new situation with no 
information or preparation available, he or she has no appropriate reaction, 
consequently an error occurs (Reason, 1990). In this case the Second Officer 
did not understand why the vessel was turning to port. In an intention to solve 
the problem, he overrode the automation system and tried to counter react 
governing the vessel manually.
Remembering Fujita & Hollnagel (2004) about the levels of control 
that a user has over a situation, the Second Officer lost total control of the 
situation (SCRAMBLED15).  In this  regards  it  was shown in practice what 
Lutzhoft said about the fact that seafarers do not use technology in emergency 
situations.
4. KNOWLEDGE OF THE TECHNOLOGY. The NACOS 65-5 allowed the 
users  to  set  determined  parameters  depending  upon  the  situation.  Those 
parameters are the Rudder Limit, the Rudder Economy and the Course Limit. 
15 See Section 3.4
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The Rudder Economy could be chosen in a range of 10 different levels and 
level 5 was the selected level when the accident happened. According to the 
producer of that technology, this level of Rudder Economy was thought to be 
used in bad weather (NTSB, 2008). As the level was increasing in number, 
the aim was to provide more flexibility to the rudder position accordingly to 
the rough weather.
In the report it was established that the weather conditions were calm. 
This actual setting of the Rudder Economy was not in the awareness of the 
Second Officer (NTSB,2008). 
Also, the system had three different modes to carry out the navigation: 
Heading Mode, Course Mode and Track Mode. Heading Mode was selected 
at the time of the accident, which meant that the autopilot had to follow the 
course established using mainly the Gyrocompass signal (NTSB,2008). 
Sam Electronics, requested by the NTSB, conducted an investigation 
about the accident and concluded that “an improper Rudder Economy setting 
and Rudder Limit setting can lead to a non proper function of steering in 
Heading  Mode  for  this  ship’s  speed  of  18  to  20  knots  together  with  the 
measured water depth” (NTSB, p. 20, 2008). 
It would have been better to have this information prior the accident.
5. OVER RELIANCE ON TECHNOLOGY. The Captain having perceived an 
unexpected evolution of the vessel, did hand over the watch to the Second 
Officer and left the bridge. According to the Accident Report,  the Captain 
expected that  after  having selected the new Rudder Limit,  the INS would 
need some time and would stabilize the course. He did not give any particular 
order to the Second Officer in this regard (NTSB,2008).
According  to  the  Accident  Report,  the  Company  had  a  policy 
regarding  when  the  Captain  should  leave  the  bridge,  stating  that  the 
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navigational situation should be clear. Obviously, the Captain did not appraise 
any potential hazard when he left the bridge.
6. ROLES  INTERACTING  WITH  TECHNOLOGY.  According  to  Lutzhoft 
(2004), one of the roles that a human being has to perform when interacting 
with  technology  is  monitoring,  which  is  hampered  by  two  main  aspects. 
Users tend to monitor less when the system is already installed and when the 
system has been working without failures (Lutzhoft, 2004; Bainbridge, 1983). 
The main reason is because they tend to over rely on the system. So did the 
Captain as he declared on the Investigation Report. 
7. DIFFICULTIES TO UNDERSTAND WHAT WAS HAPPENNING.  In the 
Report Investigation the lack of recognition of the shallow water effects is 
mentioned. The Captain ordered to increase speed to 20 knots, and according 
to the investigation there was not sufficient depth to avoid the shallow water 
effect. Since the vessel was being steered automatically, the OOW did not 
immediately recognize the loss of manoeuvring capability. This situation was 
not recognize either by the NACOS INS. Electronic systems are not aware of 
the surrounding situation and not embedded in the environment; this is why 
they need the human intervention (Dekker. 2006; Lutzhoft, 2004).
8. THE LACK OF HMI AS A CAUSE. The causes of this accident found by 
NTSB (2008) can be summarized as:
 Primary cause: incorrect wheel commands by the 2nd Officer.
 Contributory Cause: incorrect inputs to the system by Captain and Staff 
Captain.
 Contributory Cause: insufficient training in INS operation.
However, taking a look at the complete report the lack of relationship 
between the OOW and the INS is notorious. Looking at what happened from 
hindsight  he  made  an  incorrect  decision;  however,  it  was  not  what  he 
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intended to do. For him, there was something that he did not understand, and 
he reacted in the way he had learnt. 
This accident could have been much more serious, which luckily it 
was not. The vessel was according to regulations, the ship was just brand new 
and the crew was all certified accordingly. 
5.3.- Allision of Chemical/Oil Tanker Vessel Prospero (10 
December 2006)
The Tanker Vessel Prospero was built in 2000, with 11,973 gt,  capacity of 
16,800 dwt and a length of 145,7 metres. It was provided with a podded propulsion 
drive system called Siemens-Schottel Propulsor (SSP) that could be operated from 
the bridge and engine room (MAIB & Swedish Accident Investigation Board, 2007).
Originally, it was possible to rotate the SSP 360 degrees. Nevertheless, at the 
time of the accident could only be turned 180 degrees to both sides. This limitation 
was  known  by  the  corresponding  Classification  Society,  which  had  delivered  a 
Condition of Class. The Master was also aware of this limitation (MAIB & Swedish 
Accident Investigation Board, 2007). 
At 00:35 hours the vessel was intending to moor its port side alongside the 
Milford Haven's jetty (UK) to load cargo. The vessel was almost empty, having only 
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Figure 5: Tanker Vessel Prospero
an  over-carried  cargo  of  220 tons  of  kerosene.  The  BTM was  composed  by the 
Master and the pilot. For unknown reasons, the Master did not inform the pilot about 
the limitation on the Pod, and since this particular vessel was allowed to enter to 
Milford  Haven  without  tugs,  so  it  did  and  the  pilot  agreed  (MAIB  & Swedish 
Accident Investigation Board, 2007).
When the vessel was near to moor alongside the jetty, the Master switched the 
engine control from the central console to the port console. The vessel's speed was 
around 1 knot and the Master intended to increase the speed a little in order to keep 
manoeuvring  capability.  Suddenly,  the  lever  moved  undemanded  increasing  the 
engine power to 70%. From this moment onwards, neither the Master nor the pilot 
could respond to this  unexpected event  successfully  (MAIB & Swedish Accident 
Investigation Board, 2007).
At the end, the Propulsion Control System performed some activities which 
were not understood by any of both officers; resulting in two allision with the jetty, 
one going ahead and one going astern, with structural damages to the vessel, pier and 
jetty. Luckily enough, there was no personnel injured or loss of life and the vessel 
was almost empty of cargo. No oil spill was registered.
5.3.1.- HMI aspects
1. TRAINING. The Master had been appointed on board in September 2006, 
three months before the accident happened. His certificates were up to date 
and he was considered to be an experienced Master. The Prospero Company 
has a working system for its crew one month on and one month off. This 
routine meant that the Master was doing his second trip as a Master on board 
the Prospero. It was found that neither the Master nor the engineering officers 
had had training in SSP. 
Furthermore, the accident report identified as one safety issue that the 
training  requirements  contained  in  STCW  78  as  amended  for  engineer 
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personnel were “inadequate for this type of complex plant”(MAIB & Swedish 
Accident Investigation Board, 2007, p. 58). The relevance of this finding for 
the  present  research  is  considered  twofold.  One  is  that  the  engineering 
department is part of the Human Resources of the BTM (Bowditch, 2002), 
because their appropriate qualifications are regarded as relevant. Second, it 
pointed out that the requirements of STCW did not satisfy the current reality 
of technology. In this case, the technology is at least  10 years old, and the 
crew was not prepared to deal with it.
2. TECHNOLOGY DEGRADATION. The Master of Prospero could have been 
victim of a latent error in this case originated from “faulty maintenance and 
bad management decisions”(Reason, 1990, p. 173).  There is no mention to 
whether it had been a risk assessment when the system got deteriorated due to 
the faulty Gauss transmitter, which limited its original capability of turning 
360 degrees. The decision was to continue trading with the ship, and in this 
way the risk of having an accident was taken. 
Hollnagel (2007) says that sometimes, as in case of aviation, the risk 
of falling down an air plane can be eliminated by cancelling the flight, but 
this  decision  is  against  the  proper  nature  of  the  industry;  therefore,  the 
decision of stopping the flight is not viable, consequently other approaches to 
reduce the risk of falling down the air plane are taken.
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In the case of  Prospero and looking at it from hindsight, symptoms 
indicating problems with the SSP were not considered as samples of potential 
failures (MAIB & Swedish Accident Investigation Board, 2007).
Using the Bowtie model of causes for an accident to happen (Figure 
6), it  seems that the company disregarded some indication that could have 
resulted  in  the  accident;  the  system had  had  similar  failures  before,  new 
personnel was appointed on board and no training in reversionary modes of 
the SSP was given to the new Master or engineer department, the Master did 
not asked for tugs to help in the manoeuvre. 
As is cited by Hollnagel (2007), an accident can happen due to an 
undesired event originated by certain causes, and due to a faulty use of the 
barriers (Reason, 1990). Barriers can be classified in functional, incorporeal, 
physical and symbolic (Hollnagel, 2007). In the case of the Prospero, it seems 
that no effective use of any barrier was even tried to perform. The alarm was 
not acknowledged (symbolic), the use of tugs was not considered (physical), 
the reversionary mode was not understood by the user (functional) and there 
was no procedure written in the Safety Manual of the Company to deal with 
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Figure 6: The risk Bowtie model (Hollnagel, 2007, p. 223)
this kind of situation(incorporeal) (MAIB & Swedish Accident Investigation 
Board, 2007; Hollnagel, 2007).
3. FAMILIARIZATION.  It  was  found  by  the  accident  investigation  that  the 
personnel considered the SSP very reliable and comfortable to use. The crew 
was familiar with operating the controls, but not with reversionary modes. 
Consequently,  the  Master  did  not  realize  that  the  system  triggered  a 
reversionary mode because of a failure on the primary propulsion system. 
Furthermore, the Master did not notice an alarm indicating a failure on the 
primary propulsion system (MAIB & Swedish Accident Investigation Board, 
2007).
4. HMI DESIGN. The accident investigation found deficiencies in the design of 
alarms. The Master did not acknowledge the alarm indicating the failure of 
the  primary propulsion system because he did not see it. The reason found 
was that the alarm light was dimmed together with the rest of the lightnings. 
Also,  the  volume  of  the  audible  alarm  was  not  enough  to  overcome  the 
environmental noise. 
The investigation report indicated that, at the time of constructing the 
Prospero,  the  corresponding  Classification  Society  did  not  have  a  policy 
regarding  the  HMI  concept.  Furthermore,  there  was  no   requirement 
regarding  the  documentation  to  be  submitted  by the  technology producer 
((MAIB & Swedish Accident Investigation Board, 2007). This left Prospero 
in the year 2000 with a complex propulsion system without an assessment on 
how the interaction between the human being and technology would be with 
this system.
5. CONTROL OF  THE  SITUATION.  Not  understanding  the  situation,  the 
Master  literally  started  to  fight  against  the  control  levers.  He  tried 
unsuccessfully to reduce the engine power by pushing the lever back. After a 
while,  the  engine  power  was  reduced  to  zero  without  intervention  of  the 
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Master. Nevertheless, it increased power again to 70% after a few moments. 
Just after the second collision going astern, the Master passed the control of 
SSP to the Engine room and back to the bridge; then, the operation became 
normally again (MAIB & Swedish Accident Investigation Board, 2007).
During the reversionary mode, there was a complete lack of awareness 
in what was happening by the side of the Master. (MAIB & Swedish Accident 
Investigation Board, 2007). 
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- Chapter 6 - Conclusions and Recommendations
6.1.- Conclusions
This investigation has concluded that it does exist a gap between technology 
on the bridge and the BTM, which affects the safety operation of the latter. The gap 
has  its  routes  in  problems  of  design  and  incorporation  of  technology  without 
consideration of the user's characteristics and expectations, and on the training that 
the user should receive previously being appointed to operate that technology.
However,  it  could  not  be  proved  whether  the  mentioned  gap  is  in  an 
increasing trend or not. Indeed, it should be said that the gap is in the awareness of 
the maritime community which is trying to convince the stakeholders of its existence 
and to react accordingly. 
In the last three years, Quality organisations and Classification Societies are 
establishing mandatory regulations regarding the introduction of ergonomics design 
and HMI when designing and incorporating technology on bridges.  IMO, mainly 
through non-mandatory documents,  has shown in latest times its concern in the issue 
of HMI trying to attract attention in this matter.
Following  are  subsequent  detailed  conclusions  resulted  from  this 
investigation:
1) Technology has to have a pre-designed interface created on purpose for the 
future user. In the maritime industry, this aspect is particularly difficult due to 
the  very  nature  of  multinational,  multicultural  and  multilingual  industry, 
which  signifies  that  people with strong differences  among each other  can 
operate the equipment.
2) IMO considers HMI as a technical issue, an intrinsic aspect of technology 
design.  On  the  other  hand,  designers  tend  to  consider  wrong  actions 
committed by human beings as non-technical aspects of technology. These 
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wrong actions can be the outcome of a variety of factors, among them it could 
be a wrong designed HMI and an improper education of the user on the use of 
the technology. 
3) The  introduction  of  users'  characteristics  and  expectations,  as  well  as 
ergonomic principles,  did not take place in the design of INS and IBS until 
the end of the 1990s, which affected the design of the HMI. The design of the 
technology provided on-board was more technology centred, provided with 
some interfaces which in many cases did not satisfy the user's expectations. 
Consequently, technology was not used according to its design.
4) It does exist a different philosophy between designers and users when dealing 
with technology. This difference obliges the user to adapt to a tool designed 
by a person with a different perspective about what technology should be able 
to do and how. This drawback can be reduced by using ergonomics.
5) In the maritime industry, there is no standard mandatory provision about what 
documentation and training  should the technology producer  deliver  to  the 
user. 
6) Users'  expectations  are  influenced  by  the  perception  users  have  about 
technology. There is still the same scary perception about technology which 
lead to an improper use of it.
7) Technology  today  is  less  prone  to  be  used  under  manual  modes,  which 
purport a further hazard when the users prefer to operate it manually.
8) Users  need to  have  the knowledge of  technology organized which should 
include more than normal simple operation. This is not the normal practice in 
shipping. 
9) Automation hinder the opportunities of practicing the user's skill, providing a 
long time of low workload, which lets the user to be relaxed. This situation 
tends to delay or cancel the reaction of the user in an emergency.
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10) Technology  has  introduced  more  layers  between  the  user  and  the  final 
equipment which performs the task, which in turn splits the user more from 
what  is  happening.  Users  can  induce  unintentional  errors  whose 
consequences will be delayed in time, the so-called latent errors.
11) The  Human  Factors  is  a  concept  that  leads  to  different  interpretations, 
therefore it has served as a term where many different things can fit into. 
IMO  particularly  identifies  as  the  Human  Factor  as  the  person  plus  the 
training  required  by  the  organisation.  The  problem  with  this  perception 
related to the HMI is that the training on the technology does not constitute 
today a requirement in any convention, besides familiarization.
12) The  concept  of  HMI  involves  the  interaction  of  human  beings  with 
technology to perform a task. For that, HMI needs a clear understanding of 
the  Human  Factor  to  be  designed  accordingly.  If  there  is  confusion  or 
ambiguousness  in  the  terminology,  a  misled  address  to  the  HMI  can  be 
executed.
13) A general  trend  was  found  of  attributing  every  wrong  happening  with 
technology to wrong action committed by humans, assuming human beings to 
be  less  reliable  than technology.  Moreover,  there  is  a  proved tendency to 
incorporate  more technology in  order  to deal  with the unreliability of the 
human  beings.  However,  INS  and  IBS  systems  do  need  the  presence  of 
human beings to operate.
14) Human Error is generally considered to be a complex issue, where aspects of 
human beings, situation and environment play important roles; however, IMO 
has  a  definition  of  Human  Error  which  does  not  specify  what  are  the 
acceptable practices or the undesirable results. 
15) IMO incorporates the HRA inside the FSA in order to assess the participation 
of human aspects on the overall risk, but stressing that this part of the Safety 
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Assessment should not be overstressed. Furthermore, data has indicated that 
the major effort of resources in the maritime industry is being done more in 
technical aspects than on the human side. It seems as to be an intention of 
considering the human being in the industry but at the same time not much 
effort is allocated to understand it and improve its quality.
16) The techniques used in IMO to assess human reliability are being put aside in 
other industries and succeeded by a second generation of HRA techniques. 
These  techniques  are  strongly  criticized  by  ergonomic  practitioners.  The 
second  generation  of  HRA techniques  gives  to  the  context  of  use  of  the 
technology the principal factor that determines the occurrence of error.
17) It  was found that  the requirements  contained in  SOLAS 74 regarding the 
incorporation of technology on the bridge, are centralized in what technology 
should be  able  to  do,  which  is  generally speaking,  easing the  task of  the 
Bridge Team Management. However, there is no consideration of the user's 
characteristics  and  expectations.  Therefore,  it  should  be  argued  how 
technology can ease the task of someone who perhaps does not understand 
that technology. 
18) The ISM Code and STCW 78 as amended, include the aspect of training with 
technology within  the  broad term familiarization  with  the  equipment,  not 
stating  clearly  how  this  familiarization  should  be  done  and  verified.  The 
responsibility of the familiarization is assigned to the shipping companies.
19) In 2003, IMO started to  include training considerations in  its  non-binding 
regulations allocating the responsibility of that on the shipping companies. In 
this regard, IMO has acknowledged the difficulties occurring when intending 
to train in the new technology, recognising the existence of situations where 
users  are  not  provided  with  any training  on  the  technology they  have  to 
operate.
73
20) In 2005, IMO recognising that special knowledge is required by the OOW to 
operate IBS/INS, validated a model course for IBS/INS. This course intends 
to  provide  foundations  of  these  systems.  However,  it  also  needs  to  be 
supported by a posteriori  familiarization of the specific  equipment,  taking 
into account the lack of standardization in design. 
21) Last  year,  a  proposal  was  submitted  to  revise  the  INS/IBS  performance 
standards to be included in further revisions to the SOLAS 74 Convention. 
The document underlines the advantages of using INS/IBS. However, these 
systems still need an efficient  interaction with the OOW in order to really 
show those advantages. Still how to educate and train the OOW on the new 
technology remain to be regulated.
22) It  was  found  that  the  concept  of  HMI  was  not  considered  by  some 
stakeholders in the maritime industry at the beginning of this decade. Vessels 
built at that time are still operating.
23) The BTM performance depends upon how the OOW operates the technology 
applied. Some examples are showing that there is a real lack of knowledge by 
the OOW and Masters regarding the features of technology. Still, it can not be 
said  that  this  shortfall  has  caused  serious  damage;  however,  the  case  of 
Crown  Princess  shows  a  clear  example  of  the  hazard  that  the  lack  of 
knowledge of technology from the users signifies.
6.2.- Recommendations
 To address  appropriately the  problem of  the  gap  between technology and 
users, it would be highly necessary to review certain fundamentals concepts 
such  as  Human Factor,  Human Element  and Human Error.  For  that,  it  is 
recommended that experience from other hazardous industries be taken. In 
this regard, the Appendix A with the adaptation of the check list used in the 
petrochemical  industry,  provided  to  the  MEPC in  2005,  provides  a  good 
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guideline to follow.
 Since the trend of incorporating technology will not stop but otherwise, it is 
necessary to train the OOW as soon as possible. It is recommended that the 
Model  Course regarding  operation  of  IBS/INS be  included as  part  of  the 
mandatory requirement in the STCW 78 as amended for Masters and OOW. 
However,  IMO  should  have  to  consider  how  to  manage  the  simulators 
requirements for this course. Simulators are assets that are not available by all 
Flag States and represent a high investments for MET institutions.
 It  is  also  recommended  that  IMO  reviews  and  clarifies  the  term 
familiarization. Familiarization with technology is a very broad term. There 
are cases showing personnel that  had had familiarization time but did not 
know how to use the technology. So far the familiarization is allocated as a 
Company responsibility, so it is recommended that it should be kept like this, 
but a way of controlling this aspect should be found.
 The SOLAS 74 Convention is needed for an update regarding the current 
reality of  technology on the  bridge.  It  is  recommended that  a  revision of 
Chapter  V  of  SOLAS  be  carried  out  considering  the  new  revision  of 
performance  standards  for  IBS  and  INS,  which  also  include  more 
consideration to the user in the design of this technology. 
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Instructions
1
2 If the answer to any of the question below is: 
(A)
(B)
©
Solution Being Assessed for Human Element System Integration
1 □Yes □No □NA
2 □Yes □No □NA
3 □Yes □No □NA
4 □Yes □No □NA
_ Administrations? _ Ship owners/managers _ Seafarers? _Surveyors? □Yes □No □NA
5 □Yes □No □NA
6 Does the solution address safeguards to avoid single person errors? □Yes □No □NA
7 □Yes □No □NA
8 Have human element experts been consulted in development of the solution? □Yes □No □NA
9
□ □Yes □No □NA
□ □Yes □No □NA
□
□
□
□ □Yes □No □NA
□ □Yes □No □NA
□
□
Checklist for Consideration of the Human Element in the Work Program of IMO Committees, Sub-
Committees, Working Rroups, Correspondence Groups
This checklist should be completed prior to finalization of development and/or amendment of mandatory 
and non-mandatory IMO instruments. Member States are encouraged to complete this checklist when 
proposing new instruments and amendments
YES, the preparing body should provide supporting details and/or recommendation for further work.
NO, the preparing body should make proper justification as to why human element issues were not 
considered.
NA (Not Applicable) – no further action needed.
Responsible Body: Committee, Sub-Committee, Working Group, Correspondence Group, Member State
Was the human element considered in this the development and amendment of this 
solution?
Was the relationship of this solution to existing human element related instruments 
considered? (Identify instruments considered in comments section)
Have human element solutions been made as an alternative and/or in conjunction with 
technical solutions?
Has human element guidance on the application and/or implemantation of the proposed 
solution been provided for the following:
At some point, before final adoption, has the solution been reviewed or considered by a 
relevant IMO body woth relevant human element expertise?
If the solution is to be directed at seafarers, is the information presented in a form that is 
both comprehensible and presentable?
HUMAN ELEMENT INTEGRATION DOMAINS: Has the solution been assessed against each domain 
below?  This assessment should include (1) identification of affects; (2) risks of the affects; and (3) how 
the risks will be managed. The assessment should consider relevant affects upon passengers, crew, and 
ship owners/managers.
MANPOWER. The number of qualified personnel required and available to safely 
operate, maintain, support, and provide training for system.
PERSONNEL. Personnel or human  factors are the necessary human aptitudes (i.e., 
cognitive, physical, and sensory capabilities), knowledge, skills, abilities, and experience 
levels that are needed to properly perform job tasks.
Cognitive requirem ents address the human's capability to evaluate and process information (i.e. 
response t ime).
Physical requirem ents  are typically stated as anthropometric (measurements of the human 
body), strength, and weight  factors.
Sensory requirements are typically visual, olfactory (smell), or hearing factors.
TRAINING. The process and tools by which personnel acquire or improve the 
necessary knowledge, skills, and abilities to achieve desired job/task performance.
SAFETY AND OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH. The safety management system 
procedures, policies, training, documentation, equipment, etc. to properly manage 
personnel safety and health risks?
Safety factors are those system factors that  minimizse the potent ial for mishaps causing death 
or injury or theraten the operat ion of the system.
Occupational health factors are those system factors that  minimize the risk of personnel injury, 
acute/chronic illness, or disability; and/or reduce job performance.
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Checklist for consideration of the Human Element
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
Assessment Team: Name/Position
HABITABILITY. Living and working conditions that are necessary to sustain the 
morale, safety, health, and comfort of those on board. Beyond providing acceptable 
quality of life, habitability affects crew endurance, fatigue and alertness. Consideration 
should include but not be limited to noise, vibration, lighting, climate, and 
accommodation areas.
PERSONNEL SURVIVABILITY. System features that reduce the risk of illness, injury, or 
death in a catastrophic event such as fire, explosion, spill, collision, flooding, or 
intentional attack. The assessment should consider desired human performance in 
emergency situations for detection, response, evacuation, survival and rescue and the 
interface with emergency procedures, systems, facilities and equipment.
HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING. Designing human-machine, or more appropriately, 
human-system interface consistent with the physical, cognitive, and sensory abilities of 
the user population.
Functional interfaces:  Allocation of functions and tasks – role of the human 
versus automation. Manning levels, skills, and training. Objective: Ability to 
perform tasks within time and accuracy constraints.
Informational interfaces: Information that provides the human with the knowledge, 
understanding and awareness of what is happening in the system. Information 
media, electronic, hard copy Objective: Ability to identify, obtain, integrate, 
understand, interpret, apply, and disseminate information.
Environmental interfaces: Physical, phychologi8cal and operational environments. 
Natural and artificial environments, environmental controls, and facility design. 
Objective:  Ability to perform under adverse environmental stress, including 
heat/cold, clothing/PPE, vibration, reduced visibility, weather, time constraints and 
psychological stress.
Co operational interfaces:  Team cooperation, collaboration, and communication 
among members and others. Objective: Ability to maintain performance over time.
Organizational interfaces: Job  design, management/organizational structure, 
command authority, policies and regulations. Objective:  Ability to perform jobs, 
tasks, and functions within management/organizational structure. Should also 
include interface with contractors, partners, suppliers, customers, competitors, 
community, regulators, professional organizations and labour organizations.
Operational interfaces: Such as procedures, documentation, workloads, job aids. 
Objective:Ability to maintain performance over time.
Cognitive interfaces: Decision rules, decision support systems, provision for 
maintaining situation awareness, mental models of the operational environment, 
provisions for knowledge generation, cognitive skills and attitudes, memory aids. 
Objective: Ability to perform problem solving, decision-making, information 
integration, and situational awareness
enable and facilitate effective and safe human performance and interaction. 
Includes controls, displays, workstations, work sites, accesses, labels, signs, 
structures, steps and ladders, handholds, maintenance provisions, etc. Objective: 
Ability to perform operations/maintenance using controls, displays, equipment, 
tools, etc.
Comments: (1) Justification for NO Answers. (2) Recommendations for additional human element 
assessment needed. (3) Key risk management strategies employed. (4) Other comments. (5) 
Supporting documentation.
Appendix B (IMO, 1998c)
Technical
(The vessel and/or its equipment)
! Design
! Ergonomics
! Manufacture/construction
! Installation
! Initial and periodic testing
! Approval
! Maintenance
! Repairs
! Modifications
! Renewals
! Expected marine environment1
! Operations2
Manning
(Master and crew of the vessel)
! Qualifications
! Number of crew members
! Composition of crew
! Culture3
! Working Language
! Medical Conditions
! Competence
Training
(Ashore and aboard)
! Basic Safety Training
! Familiarization
! Drills
! Extended safety training
! Training of personnel ashore
Management
(Ashore and aboard)
! Policy
! Safety culture
! Motivation
! Communication links
! Responsibility
! Authority
! Work planning
! Contingency planning
! Emergency response
! Manuals
! Procedures
! Instructions
! Work methods
! Checklists
! Education and Training
Work Environment/conditions
(aboard ship)
! Hazardous materials
! Man-machine interface
! Personnel protection
! Physical hazards
! Hours of work
! Hours of rest
! Fatigue
! Estimated workload5
! Actual marine environment
! Living conditions
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